Pluralism is the view that society is made up of many groups, interests, beliefs and ways of life, and that this variety is natural, valuable and should be protected and accommodated by political institutions. A pluralist does not wish to see all differences merged into one common mould, nor power gathered in a single hand. He holds that a good political order allows many centres of power, many associations and many values to exist side by side, and that they should compete, bargain and cooperate within rules agreed by all.
The word is used in several ways, and a student should keep them apart. In political science, pluralism is a theory of how power is spread in democratic societies among many competing groups, so that no single class or elite controls all decisions. In political philosophy, it is the belief that there are many different and sometimes conflicting human values, none of which can be fully reduced to another. In the study of society and culture, it is the recognition and acceptance of religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. In law and the theory of the state, it is the claim that the state is not the only source of authority and that churches, trade unions, professional bodies and local communities also have rights of their own. These meanings are connected by one common idea: that unity does not require uniformity, and that freedom and good government depend on respecting differences and sharing power. The study of pluralism is basic to democratic theory, because modern democracies are made up of people who differ widely, and the question of how they can live and decide together lies at the heart of politics.
1. Meaning and definitions of pluralism
Meaning. The word pluralism comes from the Latin plures, meaning many. In its general sense it describes a condition in which many different groups, principles or sources of authority exist together. As a doctrine, it asserts that this condition is good and should be maintained. It stands opposed to monism, which holds that there is one source of authority, one true set of values or one correct way of life, and which therefore tends to treat difference as error or danger.
Descriptive and normative pluralism. Two senses must be distinguished. Descriptive pluralism states a fact, that societies contain many groups and values, and that power is in fact divided among them. Normative pluralism states a value, that such diversity and division of power are desirable and should be protected. A writer may accept the first and deny the second, as when someone admits that his country is diverse but wishes for a single national culture. Most pluralist theorists, however, join the two, and argue that the fact of diversity is also a source of liberty and good order.
Pluralism and related terms. Pluralism is close to, but not the same as, several other ideas. Diversity describes the presence of difference, while pluralism adds the principle that this difference should be accepted and protected. Multiculturalism refers specially to the policies and attitudes by which a state recognises cultural groups. Tolerance is a personal and political attitude of putting up with what one disapproves of, whereas pluralism goes further and values the plurality. Liberalism stresses the individual, while pluralism in its group-oriented form stresses associations and communities. The relationship between them is a matter of discussion in political theory.
| Scholar | Definition or view in brief |
|---|---|
| Harold Laski | The state is one association among many, and sovereignty should be divided among the groups that make up society. |
| G. D. H. Cole | Society is a complex of associations, each with its own function, and the state should be one of them and not their master. |
| Ernest Barker | Society is a federation of groups, and the state’s work is to coordinate and harmonise them. |
| A. F. Bentley | Politics is the process of group interaction, and the group is the basic unit of political life. |
| David Truman | Political life is the interplay of organised interest groups, which balance each other. |
| Robert Dahl | Modern democracy is polyarchy, in which power is dispersed among many groups competing for influence. |
| Isaiah Berlin | Human values are many, often in conflict and incommensurable, and no single answer can resolve all conflicts among them. |
| William Connolly | Pluralism requires an ethos of engagement, where groups respect each other’s identities while accepting change in their own. |
| John Rawls | A free society is marked by reasonable pluralism, the lasting diversity of reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. |
Laski. Harold Laski, in Authority in the Modern State (1919) and A Grammar of Politics (1925), argued that the state has no right to claim absolute sovereignty. In his early pluralist writings, he held that individuals belong to many associations, such as churches, unions, clubs and professional bodies, and owe loyalty to each of them for its own purposes. The state is only one such association and its claim to obedience depends on the service it renders. In his later work, he moved toward a socialist view and gave more place to the state.
Cole. G. D. H. Cole, in Social Theory (1920) and in his works on guild socialism, regarded society as a network of functional associations, each representing people in respect of a particular purpose, and he proposed that political representation should be based on functions and not on territory alone. The state, in his view, should be a coordinating body among them.
Barker. Ernest Barker, in Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914 and Reflections on Government (1942), accepted the pluralist emphasis on groups but held that the state remains the necessary coordinating body, which gives them a legal frame and settles their disputes. His version is often called a moderate pluralism.
Bentley and Truman. Arthur F. Bentley, in The Process of Government (1908), argued that politics should be studied as the interaction of groups, and that all political phenomena can be explained in terms of group pressure. David Truman, in The Governmental Process (1951), developed the idea, and argued that overlapping memberships of individuals in different groups moderate conflict, and that potential or unorganised groups also influence the government since politicians keep their interests in mind.
Dahl. Robert Dahl, in A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956) and Who Governs? (1961), found, in his study of New Haven, that different groups held influence on different issues and that no single elite dominated all decisions. In Polyarchy (1971), he used the term to describe real democracies, which are marked by the competition of many groups and by wide participation. He called them systems of minority rule, in which different minorities prevail on different issues.
Berlin. Isaiah Berlin, in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) and in his later essays such as The Pursuit of the Ideal, put forward value pluralism. He held that human beings pursue many values, among them liberty, equality, justice, mercy and knowledge, which are objectively good but may conflict, and that there is no single scale by which they can be weighed in all cases. A society, therefore, has to make hard choices, and the claim that one doctrine can reconcile all values leads to intolerance and coercion.
Connolly. William Connolly, in The Terms of Political Discourse (1974) and Pluralism (2005), argued that a democratic society must encourage a culture of respect and generosity toward differences, in which groups accept that their own identities are open to change. His approach is called deep pluralism, and it addresses new and emerging identities that do not find a place in existing arrangements.
Rawls. John Rawls, in Political Liberalism (1993), described the fact of reasonable pluralism as the permanent condition of free societies. In such societies, citizens hold various religious, philosophical and moral doctrines, all reasonable, and they cannot be brought into agreement except by oppression. The task of a just political order is therefore to find principles on which all can agree despite their differences, which he called an overlapping consensus.
2. Origins and evolution
Early roots. The idea that society consists of many parts which should be kept in balance is old. Aristotle, in the Politics, criticised Plato’s wish to make the city too unified, and held that a polis is by nature a plurality of persons of different kinds, and that excessive unity would destroy it. He advocated a mixed constitution, in which the interests of various classes are balanced. In India, Ashoka’s edicts called for respect for all sects, and Akbar’s policy of sulh-i-kul, or universal peace, attempted to give a place to many faiths in the imperial order.
Medieval and early modern background. In medieval Europe, power was shared among the Church, the nobles, the towns, the guilds and the king, so that there was no single sovereign of the later kind. The Reformation and the wars of religion made the question of living with different beliefs urgent. Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) argued that the magistrate has no right to impose faith, and the experience of religious toleration in the Netherlands and in England prepared the way for a wider pluralism.
Montesquieu, Madison and Tocqueville. Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1748) argued that liberty depends on the division of power and on intermediate bodies standing between the individual and the ruler. Madison, in Federalist No. 10 (1787), argued that the danger of faction in a republic can be reduced by extending the sphere and multiplying interests, so that no single faction can control the others. Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, regarded voluntary associations as the safeguards of liberty against both majority tyranny and state power. These three thinkers are regarded as the forerunners of modern political pluralism.
Nineteenth-century sources. In Germany, Otto von Gierke argued that groups such as guilds and corporations have a real personality and are not creations of the state, and his work was translated and spread by the English historian F. W. Maitland. In France, Émile Durkheim saw occupational groups as essential to moral order in an industrial society, and Proudhon advocated federalism and mutual associations. J. S. Mill, in On Liberty (1859), defended diversity of opinions and ways of life, as necessary for human development and progress.
The early twentieth-century English pluralists. Between about 1900 and 1925, a group of English writers, including Maitland, J. N. Figgis, Laski, Cole and Barker, attacked the theory of the sovereign state as developed by Hobbes, Bentham and Austin. They argued that the state is only one among many associations, that groups like churches and trade unions have a life of their own, and that sovereignty should be divided. Figgis, in Churches in the Modern State (1913), defended the freedom of the Church against the claims of the state, and the group had a major influence on the thought of the time, though it declined after the First World War, when the expansion of state functions seemed to many to weaken its case.
American group theory. In the United States, Bentley’s The Process of Government (1908) and later Truman’s The Governmental Process (1951) and Earl Latham’s studies treated politics as a process of group interaction. In the 1950s and 1960s, pluralism became the main theory of American democracy, with Dahl as its leading figure. It was put forward as a description of the way power in the United States is spread among competing groups, such as business, labour, farmers and professional associations, with the government acting as an umpire and as a broker.
Critique and neo-pluralism. From the 1960s, the theory was criticised by writers such as C. Wright Mills, who argued that a power elite governed America, by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, who pointed to a second face of power in which some issues are kept off the agenda, by E. E. Schattschneider, who said that the pluralist heaven has a strong upper-class accent, and by Marxists. In reply, writers such as Dahl and Charles Lindblom admitted that business has a privileged position and that inequalities of resources distort competition, and developed what is called neo-pluralism, which retains the stress on group competition but admits the unequal power of groups.
Value pluralism and cultural pluralism. From the 1960s, the philosophical pluralism of Berlin and the cultural pluralism of writers on race, ethnicity and religion gave the term wider uses. Horace Kallen in the United States had already proposed the idea of cultural pluralism in 1915, as an alternative to the melting pot. Later, communitarian and multicultural thinkers such as Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka and Bhikhu Parekh developed the connection between pluralism and the recognition of minority cultures.
The present. Pluralism today covers a wide field, from the study of interest groups and lobbying, to debates on religious and cultural diversity, immigration and identity politics, to the philosophy of value. It has also encountered new challenges in the form of populist movements, which claim to speak for a single people against elites and minorities, and in the rise of social media, which both widens public participation and, in the view of some, strengthens group polarisation. These developments make the study of pluralism relevant to the problems of modern democracies.
3. Features of pluralism
- Many groups and centres of power. Pluralism holds that society contains many groups, such as trade unions, business bodies, caste and community associations, religious organisations, professional councils, farmers’ unions and women’s groups, and that political power is spread among them and not held by one centre. In a pluralist society, a government decision usually comes after bargaining among several groups, as when a farm law or labour code is changed after pressure from different sides.
- Dispersal and limitation of power. No single group, class or institution should be able to dominate all others, and power is checked by the existence of rivals. This idea is found in Montesquieu’s division of powers, in federalism and in the independence of courts, the press and the Election Commission. A concentration of power in one hand is regarded as dangerous to liberty.
- Diversity as a value. Pluralism does not merely tolerate differences of language, religion, custom and opinion, but regards them as enriching. Mill held that variety of lives and opinions is needed for human progress, and the Indian saying anekta mein ekta, unity in diversity, expresses a similar attitude.
- Competition and bargaining. Groups pursue their interests by lobbying, public campaigns, litigation, protest, and electoral support. The political process is therefore one of competition, negotiation and compromise, with the government acting as an umpire or broker. The clash is generally resolved by give and take and not by force.
- Overlapping memberships. An individual belongs to several groups at once, for example as a worker, a member of a caste, a believer, a resident of a locality and a parent. Truman and Dahl argued that these cross-cutting loyalties moderate conflict, since a person who is an opponent of another on one issue may be an ally on another.
- Autonomy of associations. Groups and associations are allowed to govern their own internal affairs, to hold their own beliefs and to pursue their own purposes, within the limits of law. The early English pluralists, such as Figgis, defended the freedom of churches and trade unions from state control. In India, Articles 25 to 30 secure similar freedoms for religious and cultural groups.
- Role of the state as a neutral arbiter. In the pluralist view the state is not the instrument of a single class or party, but an arena or referee where groups compete and where rules are set for the competition. It protects the right of all to organise, enforces agreements and ensures that no group uses force against the others.
- Rule of law and a framework of agreed rules. Pluralism is not a free-for-all. It requires a common framework of rules, such as a constitution, rights and fair procedures, within which differences are conducted peacefully. Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus on political principles is an example of such a framework.
- Tolerance and mutual respect. Groups are expected to accept the right of others to exist and to hold different views, even when they disagree with them. Without this attitude, pluralism turns into a competition of closed and hostile communities.
- Open and participatory politics. Pluralism favours free speech, freedom of association, free press and open access of groups to the political system, so that new interests and voices can make themselves heard. Dahl’s two dimensions of polyarchy, contestation and inclusiveness, express this openness.
- Opposition to monism and absolutism. Pluralism denies that there is one single truth, one ruling class, one correct culture or one source of sovereignty. It is therefore opposed to totalitarian and authoritarian doctrines which claim to represent the whole truth and suppress the rest. Berlin’s warning about the dangers of monist doctrines is in this line.
- Recognition of the limits of reason in resolving value conflicts. Value pluralists hold that some conflicts among values, such as that between liberty and equality, cannot be settled by any final formula, and that societies must make reasoned but provisional compromises. This gives politics a continuing and unfinished character.
4. Types of pluralism
| Type | Main idea | Associated thinkers |
|---|---|---|
| Political or interest-group pluralism | Power is dispersed among competing groups | Bentley, Truman, Dahl, Lindblom |
| Institutional or constitutional pluralism | Power is divided among institutions through separation of powers and federalism | Montesquieu, Madison |
| Legal or juridical pluralism | The state is not the only source of law and authority | Gierke, Maitland, Figgis, Ehrlich |
| Associational or functional pluralism | Society is a federation of associations that deserve autonomy | Laski, Cole, Barker, Durkheim |
| Cultural or ethnic pluralism | Different cultures and communities should coexist and be recognised | Kallen, Taylor, Kymlicka, Parekh |
| Religious pluralism | Many faiths should coexist with equal respect | Locke, Gandhi, Bhargava |
| Moral or value pluralism | Human values are many and may conflict | Berlin, Raz, Williams |
| Economic pluralism | Many forms of ownership and enterprise coexist | Cole, Dahl, Lindblom |
Political or interest-group pluralism. This is the form most discussed in political science. It describes the political process as one in which organised interests compete for influence, and holds that this competition, along with overlapping memberships and the government’s role as umpire, produces a rough balance and protects against tyranny. Its description of American politics by Dahl and Truman, and its later criticisms, form a large part of the literature.
Institutional or constitutional pluralism. In this sense, pluralism refers to the arrangement of the state itself in such a way that power is divided and checked, as in the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, federal division between the Union and the States, a bicameral legislature and independent regulatory bodies. India’s Constitution, with its federal structure, independent judiciary and constitutional bodies, is an example.
Legal pluralism. Legal pluralism recognises that several systems of law may operate in the same society, for example the state law, religious personal laws, customary laws of tribes and communities, and the rules of professional and commercial bodies. In India, the personal laws of different communities, the customary laws recognised for Scheduled Tribes in the Fifth and Sixth Schedules and the village panchayat tradition are cases of legal pluralism, and the debate on the Uniform Civil Code concerns the question of how far such pluralism should continue.
Associational or functional pluralism. The early English pluralists emphasised that individuals realise themselves through associations and that the state should respect their autonomy. They proposed that these bodies should have a share in government, for example through functional representation. The idea has been partly followed in corporatist arrangements and in the nomination of experts to second chambers.
Cultural pluralism. Cultural pluralism refers to the coexistence of many cultures, languages and ways of life in a single society, each with the right to preserve and develop its identity. Horace Kallen, in 1915, described the United States as a federation of nationalities, as an alternative to assimilation. It is the basis for modern policies of multiculturalism, minority rights and linguistic and cultural autonomy.
Religious pluralism. Religious pluralism means that many religions are allowed to exist and are treated with equal respect. It has two aspects. In the social and political sense, it means freedom of religion, equal treatment by the state and peaceful coexistence of faiths. In the theological sense, it means the view that different faiths are valid paths, which is not accepted by all believers. Gandhi’s sarva dharma sambhava, or equal regard for all religions, and the Indian model of secularism expressed in Articles 25 to 28 are cases of religious pluralism in the first sense.
Moral or value pluralism. This is the philosophical form, set out by Berlin, Bernard Williams, Joseph Raz and others. It states that there are many genuine values, that they cannot all be realised together and that they cannot be ranked on a single scale. It differs from relativism, because it holds that values are objective and not matters of mere taste, and that some ways of life are still outside the bounds of the acceptable.
Economic pluralism. Economic pluralism refers to the coexistence of different forms of property and enterprise, such as private firms, public enterprises, co-operatives, community-owned bodies and self-help groups, with none of them in complete control. Cole’s guild socialism, Dahl’s proposals for worker-managed firms and India’s mixed economy, with its public, private and co-operative sectors, are examples.
5. Theories of pluralism
| Theory | Central idea | Main thinkers |
|---|---|---|
| Classical pluralism | Division of power and intermediate bodies protect liberty | Montesquieu, Madison, Tocqueville |
| English or state pluralism | Sovereignty of the state is denied; groups share authority | Figgis, Maitland, Laski, Cole, Barker |
| American group theory | Politics is group competition; government is an umpire | Bentley, Truman, Latham |
| Dahl’s polyarchy | Many minorities rule in turn through competition | Dahl, Lindblom |
| Neo-pluralism | Pluralism is qualified by the privileged position of business | Lindblom, Dahl in later work |
| Value pluralism | Human values are many and conflicting | Berlin, Raz, Williams, Gray |
| Agonistic and deep pluralism | Conflict is permanent, and should be turned into respectful rivalry | Connolly, Mouffe |
| Cultural pluralism and multiculturalism | Cultural groups deserve recognition | Kallen, Taylor, Kymlicka, Parekh |
Classical pluralism. Montesquieu held that moderate government requires intermediate powers between the king and the people, such as the nobility, the clergy, the towns and the parlements. Madison’s solution to the problem of faction was to multiply interests in a large republic, and to check ambition by ambition through separation of powers. Tocqueville feared that equality would produce isolated individuals before a powerful state, and looked to associations, local self-government and a free press as protections. This tradition is concerned with liberty, and treats the division of power as its guarantee.
The English pluralist critique of sovereignty. Early in the twentieth century, Maitland, Figgis, Laski, Cole and Barker attacked the legal theory of sovereignty of Hobbes, Bentham and Austin, which held that every state has a single, absolute and indivisible sovereign. They said that this theory does not correspond to the facts, since people give their real loyalty to many groups, and that it is dangerous, since it makes the state the master of all associations. Laski argued that the state should be treated as one association, whose claim to obedience rests on its service to the public interest, and that where it does not serve, individuals are free to resist. Figgis argued for the inherent rights of the Church and of other bodies, while Cole proposed functional representation and workers’ control. Critics replied that this view underestimates the role of the state in maintaining order and in protecting individuals against the tyranny of groups, and many of the pluralists, including Laski, revised their views later.
American group theory. Bentley argued that all politics can be understood as the struggle of groups, and that without groups there would be no political life. Truman added the idea of overlapping membership and the concept of potential groups, which means that unorganised interests which could be organised if they were threatened are also taken into account by politicians. In this view, the political system maintains an equilibrium, and the government is the arena where interests are balanced. The theory gives a picture of a stable, open and responsive politics, and was influential in the 1950s and early 1960s.
Dahl and polyarchy. Dahl’s study of New Haven, Who Governs?, found that different groups and leaders had influence over different issues, such as urban renewal, education and party nominations, and that no one elite dominated all of them. He concluded that power in the city was dispersed. In Polyarchy, he gave a more general account, in which democracy, in the full sense, is an ideal, and actual democracies are polyarchies, defined by eight institutional guarantees, including the right to vote, the right to be elected, free and fair elections, freedom of association and expression, alternative sources of information and institutions that make government policies depend on votes. He stressed two dimensions, contestation and inclusiveness. Polyarchy is thus a pluralist order, in which many minorities compete.
Critiques of the pluralist account of power. The pluralist view has been challenged from several quarters. C. Wright Mills, in The Power Elite (1956), maintained that real power in the United States was held by a small elite of corporate, military and political leaders. E. E. Schattschneider, in The Semisovereign People (1960), said that the pluralist chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent, because organised interest groups are dominated by the well-off and business. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, in an essay of 1962, argued that power also has a second face, in which the powerful prevent some issues from reaching the agenda, so that studying only visible decisions misses real power. Steven Lukes, in Power: A Radical View (1974), added a third face, in which the powerful shape the wishes and beliefs of others, so that conflict does not arise. Marxists argue that the state in capitalist society is not a neutral umpire but serves the interests of the dominant class, as in Ralph Miliband’s The State in Capitalist Society (1969) and Nicos Poulantzas’s work.
Neo-pluralism. In response, Dahl and Lindblom revised their views. Lindblom, in Politics and Markets (1977), recognised that business has a privileged position in a market economy, because governments depend on business investment for employment and growth, and so cannot afford to ignore its interests. Dahl, in Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (1982) and A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985), acknowledged that organised pluralism may maintain inequalities and may lead to stability that protects the existing distribution of power, and he suggested democratisation of the economy. The neo-pluralist account thus keeps the idea of competition among groups, but admits that groups are not equal in resources.
Corporatism as a contrast. Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch distinguished pluralism from corporatism. In pluralism, groups are many, voluntary, competing and independent of the state. In corporatism, a limited number of groups, often compulsory and organised by sector, are recognised by the state and given a monopoly of representation in return for accepting state guidance, as in the tripartite bargaining among government, employers and trade unions in Austria, Sweden and Germany. Many contemporary systems show a mixture, and India has both competing interest groups and some corporatist arrangements, such as tripartite labour boards.
Value pluralism. Berlin argued that the belief that all genuine values can be harmonised is a deep illusion, and that human beings face tragic choices between goods. This does not lead to relativism, because the values are objective and the range of permissible ways of life is limited by what he called the common moral horizon of human beings. His liberalism is based on this: since no single answer can be proved, individuals must be left free to make their own choices. John Gray, in Two Faces of Liberalism (2000), argued that value pluralism leads to a politics of peaceful coexistence of different ways of life, not necessarily to liberalism of the usual kind. Joseph Raz, in The Morality of Freedom (1986), maintained that value pluralism supports a perfectionist liberal state which provides a range of valuable options. Critics, such as Ronald Dworkin, doubt that values really conflict in the way Berlin claimed.
Agonistic and deep pluralism. Chantal Mouffe, in The Return of the Political (1993) and On the Political (2005), argued that politics is marked by lasting conflict between opposed identities, and that the aim of democracy is not to remove this conflict but to turn enmity into agonism, in which opponents regard one another as legitimate adversaries. Connolly’s deep pluralism asks that groups cultivate a generous ethos of engagement, and recognise that their own identities are contingent. Both approaches reject the aim of consensus and are related to the criticism of rationalist liberalism.
Cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. In response to the question of how people with different cultures can live together as equal citizens, writers such as Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Iris Marion Young and Bhikhu Parekh built a theory of the recognition of cultural groups and of minority rights. Taylor, in his essay on the politics of recognition (1992), argued that identity is formed through recognition by others and that denial of recognition is a form of harm. Kymlicka, in Multicultural Citizenship (1995), distinguished national minorities from immigrant groups and argued for group-differentiated rights compatible with liberal principles. Parekh, in Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000), proposed an intercultural dialogue among cultures, in which none is regarded as the standard of judgment.
6. Pluralism and democracy
Why democracy needs pluralism. A democracy has no meaning if there is only one permitted party, one permitted opinion or one permitted source of power. Competition among parties, free expression of different views, and the existence of independent associations are conditions of democratic choice. Dahl listed the institutions of polyarchy, and each of them presupposes plurality: free and fair elections need rival candidates, freedom of expression needs diverse opinions, alternative sources of information need a variety of media, and associational autonomy needs independent organisations. Where pluralism is suppressed, as in one-party states, democracy is empty.
Pluralism as a safeguard against tyranny. The dispersal of power among many groups and institutions makes it hard for any one to dominate, and protects individuals and minorities. Madison’s argument about faction, Tocqueville’s praise of associations and Montesquieu’s division of powers are all arguments of this kind. The existence of independent courts, a free press, active trade unions, opposition parties and a federal system gives citizens places to turn to when one authority acts unjustly.
Pluralism and majority rule. Pluralism gives a corrective to the simple view of democracy as majority rule. In a plural society, majorities are not fixed but formed and changed by coalitions of groups that vary from issue to issue, and the rights of minorities are protected by constitutional limits. Dahl argued that in practice democracy is rule by minorities, since majorities are rarely organised on all questions. When, however, a majority is formed on an identity such as religion, language or ethnicity, and persists on all issues, pluralism and democracy may come into conflict, as the tyranny of the majority that Mill and Tocqueville feared.
Pluralism and representation. Representation is a way in which plurality is brought into the legislature. Proportional systems, reservations of seats, federal arrangements and separate institutions for minorities aim to ensure that groups have a voice. Consociational theory, developed by Arend Lijphart from the study of Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria, held that deeply divided societies can be stable if elites of the main groups cooperate through grand coalitions, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy. Critics such as Donald Horowitz argue for incentives that cut across group lines, not for institutionalising group differences.
Pluralism and participation. Pluralism relies on the participation of groups, but it does not necessarily encourage the participation of all individuals. Critics said that the pluralist model favoured those who were organised and had resources, and that unorganised persons, such as the poor, the unemployed and migrants, were left out. Participatory and deliberative models try to correct this by calling for wider inclusion and discussion.
Pluralism and deliberation. In a plural society, there will be disagreement on basic values, and a way of dealing with it is by public reasoning. Rawls’s reasonable pluralism and Gutmann and Thompson’s treatment of moral disagreement take pluralism as the starting point for deliberative theory. Agonists such as Mouffe, on the contrary, hold that pluralism implies lasting conflicts, and that democracy should provide channels for these conflicts and not seek to end them.
Tensions and limits. Pluralism does not mean that everything must be tolerated. Berlin and Rawls both say that a pluralist society must draw a line at the doctrines that deny the equal freedom of others. This is called the paradox of tolerance, which Karl Popper expressed in saying that unlimited tolerance may lead to the disappearance of tolerance. There are also tensions between group rights and individual rights, for example when a community’s customs deny equality to women or dissenting members. Such questions are the subject of debate over minority rights, to which writers like Susan Moller Okin, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (1999), and Kymlicka have contributed.
Contemporary challenges. Populism, which claims to speak for the single true people against elites and minorities, is a challenge to pluralism, since it tends to deny the legitimacy of opponents. Identity politics, religious majoritarianism, and political polarisation, especially as magnified by digital media, tend to reduce the overlapping memberships that moderate conflict. Rising inequality gives some groups more weight than others. At the same time, new social movements and the claims of women, sexual minorities, Dalits, Adivasis, migrants and others add new voices to the plural society.
7. The Indian perspective
Social and cultural plurality. India is among the most plural societies in the world. It has twenty-two languages listed in the Eighth Schedule and hundreds of languages and dialects in use, followers of all major religions, thousands of castes and sub-castes, over seven hundred Scheduled Tribes, wide regional differences in culture and economy, and the experience of federal and local government. The Census of 2011 showed Hindus at about 79.8 per cent, Muslims at about 14.2 per cent, Christians at 2.3 per cent, Sikhs at 1.7 per cent, Buddhists at 0.7 per cent and Jains at 0.4 per cent. Such diversity makes the question of pluralism central to Indian politics.
Pluralist traditions in Indian thought. India has a long tradition of accommodating plurality. The Rig Veda says that truth is one but the wise call it by many names. Ashoka’s twelfth Rock Edict called for restraint in speech and respect for the sects of others. The Jain doctrine of anekantavada, the many-sidedness of reality, and the Buddhist teaching of the middle way show pluralist philosophical attitudes. Akbar’s sulh-i-kul, the bhakti and Sufi movements, Kabir and Nanak, and the composite culture of north India expressed a spirit of coexistence. Gandhi’s sarva dharma sambhava and Tagore’s idea of an India open to many cultures continued the line. Scholars such as Amartya Sen emphasise this tradition, while others, among them Ashis Nandy, have written on the tolerance of everyday life in India.
The Constituent Assembly and the choice of pluralism. The framers faced the trauma of Partition and the fear of fragmentation, and still chose a Constitution that accommodated diversity. They provided for a federal union with a strong centre but with States organised largely on a linguistic basis, a secular state which treats all religions with equal respect, fundamental rights for individuals, and special protections for minorities and weaker sections. Debates on separate electorates, which were rejected, on the language of the Union, which ended in the compromise of Hindi in Devanagari script as the official language along with English, and on the rights of minorities showed the effort to find agreement across differences. Ambedkar, Nehru, Patel, Azad and others spoke of both unity and diversity.
| Provision | Concern |
|---|---|
| Preamble | Justice, liberty, equality and fraternity; secular, democratic republic |
| Articles 14 to 18 | Equality before law; non-discrimination; abolition of untouchability |
| Article 19 | Freedom of speech, association and others |
| Articles 25 to 28 | Freedom of religion; religious denominations’ management of affairs |
| Articles 29 and 30 | Cultural and educational rights of minorities |
| Articles 1 to 4; Seventh Schedule | Federal structure; reorganisation of States; division of powers |
| Article 343 to 351; Eighth Schedule | Official language and recognition of languages |
| Articles 330 to 342 | Reservation of seats; special provisions for Scheduled Castes and Tribes |
| Fifth and Sixth Schedules | Tribal areas and autonomous councils |
| Article 370 (as it stood until 2019) and Article 371 series | Special provisions for certain states |
| Articles 243 to 243ZG | Panchayats and municipalities |
Federalism and linguistic states. The reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis, after the States Reorganisation Commission of 1953-55 and the States Reorganisation Act of 1956, was a major step in accommodating plurality. It took the demands of linguistic communities into the political system, and, contrary to fears, strengthened national unity. The Sixth Schedule in the north-east, the special provisions in Article 371 for states such as Nagaland, Mizoram and Sikkim, and the accords that ended insurgencies show a flexible approach to accommodating regional and ethnic differences. Scholars such as Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Yogendra Yadav have described India as a state-nation, in which many cultural communities are held together by a shared political order rather than by one national culture.
Secularism and religious plurality. Indian secularism is not a strict separation, but a principled distance, as Rajeev Bhargava has argued, in which the state treats all religions with equal respect and may intervene to correct injustices within religions, as in the abolition of untouchability and in reforms of personal laws. In S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that secularism is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The coexistence of personal laws and the continuing debate on the Uniform Civil Code, in Article 44, shows the tension between legal pluralism and equality, especially gender equality, as in the Shah Bano case (1985), the Shayara Bano case (2017) on triple talaq, and the debate on women’s entry to places of worship, as in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) on the Sabarimala temple.
Interest groups, parties and movements. Indian politics shows a rich variety of groups and parties: caste and community associations, farmers’ organisations, trade unions, industry bodies such as the FICCI and CII, women’s groups, student unions, non-governmental organisations, and social movements. Rajni Kothari described the Congress system of one dominant party containing many factions, in which competition among factions took the place of competition among parties. After the 1960s and the rise of regional and caste-based parties, and the coalition era from 1989 to 2014, pluralism took the form of a multi-party competition. Writers such as Yogendra Yadav have spoken of the democratic upsurge, in which castes and groups earlier at the margin took a larger share of political space, and Christophe Jaffrelot has studied the rise of the lower castes and the idea of the silent revolution. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, in The Modernity of Tradition (1967), argued that caste associations act as channels of political participation in a democratic way.
Challenges to pluralism in India. A number of developments are discussed as challenges. The rise of majoritarian and identity-based politics, communal violence such as the anti-Sikh riots of 1984, the Bombay riots of 1992-93 and the Gujarat violence of 2002, caste atrocities, the question of the status of migrants and of citizenship, as in the debates on the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019 and the National Register of Citizens, are cited as threats to equal citizenship. The domination of the Hindi language in some contexts raises concern about linguistic equality in the south and the north-east. Inequalities in resources among groups, concentration of media ownership and polarising social media affect fair competition. Bhikhu Parekh and others have urged a vision of India as a community of communities, and the Supreme Court has several times emphasised the value of fraternity, and constitutional morality, and held that diversity of views is essential to democracy, as in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) and Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) on free speech.
8. Importance and limitations of pluralism
Importance and merits
- Protects liberty by dividing power. When power is shared among many groups and institutions, no one of them can easily become a tyrant. The independence of courts, the press, federal units and associations makes the abuse of power more difficult and gives citizens alternative places to seek protection.
- Gives expression to the real diversity of society. Modern societies are not uniform, and a political system that pretends otherwise either suppresses or ignores large sections of its people. Pluralism gives all groups a legitimate place and voice, and in a country such as India it is a condition of national unity.
- Supports democracy and political competition. Free competition among parties, groups and ideas is the basis of democratic choice, and pluralism provides the social foundation for it. Dahl’s polyarchy shows how competition and inclusion go together.
- Moderates conflict through overlapping memberships. Individuals who belong to several groups have cross-cutting loyalties and are less likely to take extreme positions. A worker who is also a member of a religious community and a regional association is held by several ties, which softens divisions.
- Encourages bargaining and compromise. Because no group can win on all issues, the system promotes negotiation, coalition-building and moderation, and discourages the politics of total victory and total defeat. Coalition governments in India have often shown this process.
- Promotes tolerance and mutual respect. A culture in which different beliefs and ways of life are respected is one in which minorities can live without fear, and the habit of listening to the other side is developed. Mill, Berlin and Gandhi each valued this.
- Allows flexibility and innovation. Many centres of initiative, in states, local bodies, voluntary associations and enterprises, can try different policies and ideas. This is the argument for federalism as a laboratory, and it allows the society to learn and adapt.
- Guards against dogmatism and totalitarianism. By denying that any one doctrine holds the whole truth, pluralism undermines the claims of ideologies which seek to impose uniformity by force. Berlin’s writing on the dangers of monism, written in the shadow of Nazism and Stalinism, makes this case.
- Makes room for minorities and the vulnerable. In a plural system, minorities have a chance to organise, to bargain and to seek constitutional protection, so that they are not subject to the unchecked will of the majority. Articles 29 and 30 of the Indian Constitution are an example.
- Provides a realistic account of politics. Pluralist theory describes the way that politics works in many democracies, as a process of group interaction, and so it helps in understanding policy-making, lobbying and the role of associations in a way that theories of pure individual choice or class conflict do not.
Limitations and criticisms
- Unequal power of groups. Groups differ greatly in wealth, organisation and access, and business, the wealthy and the well-organised tend to win. Schattschneider’s remark about the upper-class accent of the pluralist chorus summarises this criticism, and Lindblom’s recognition of the privileged position of business supports it.
- Neglect of the unorganised and the poor. Those who lack the resources to form groups, such as the poor, migrant workers, the elderly and children, are often left out, and their interests are represented only indirectly. In India, informal workers, who form the majority of the workforce, have very weak organisation.
- The hidden faces of power. The pluralist focus on visible decisions overlooks the power to keep issues off the agenda and to shape beliefs, as Bachrach, Baratz and Lukes argued. A group that is never allowed to bring its demands forward does not appear in the study of decisions.
- Fragmentation and deadlock. When many groups have vetoes, the system may be unable to take bold decisions or carry out long-term reforms. Writers such as Theodore Lowi, in The End of Liberalism (1969), argued that interest-group liberalism leads to a weak and captured state, in which public power is parcelled out to private interests.
- Capture of the state and rent-seeking. Powerful groups may capture regulators and use the government for their own gain, at the cost of the public interest. Mancur Olson, in The Logic of Collective Action (1965), showed that small and concentrated groups organise more easily than large and diffuse ones, so that policy may favour narrow interests over the general good.
- Weak concern with the common good. If politics is merely a competition of interests, there is little place for questions of justice and common purposes. Critics from the republican, communitarian and deliberative traditions argue that pluralism reduces politics to bargaining, and does not ask what is just.
- Conservative bias. Because pluralism sees the existing balance of groups as normal, it may give legitimacy to the status quo and discourage radical change that would shift the balance. Marxists argue that it hides the real class structure of society.
- Conflict between group rights and individual rights. Where groups are given autonomy, individuals within them, especially women and dissenters, may be denied equal treatment. The debates over personal laws in India and over the rights of women in minority communities, as raised by Okin, illustrate this problem.
- Risk of entrenching identities. Recognition of groups may harden their boundaries, encourage separatism and make it difficult for individuals to leave or reinterpret their identities. Critics of consociational arrangements, like Horowitz, make this point and also point to the risk of communal politics.
- Relativism and the problem of limits. If all values and groups are to be respected, it becomes hard to say where tolerance ends, and how to deal with groups that reject pluralism itself. Value pluralists answer that there are objective limits, but the drawing of these limits remains controversial.
9. Critical analysis
The appeal of pluralism lies in its combination of realism and liberty. It describes politics as it appears in complex societies, as a process of groups making claims and bargaining, and it values the diversity and balance of forces that protect freedom. It offers a middle path between the idea of a single sovereign will and the idea of a society of isolated individuals, and it gives theoretical support to federalism, to freedom of association, to a free press and to the toleration of differences. In the age of totalitarian states, it was a defence of free societies, and in the present time of mass migration and identity politics, it helps in the search for terms of common life.
The criticisms, however, show that pluralism as a description of existing democracies is incomplete, and as a normative theory is in need of support. The unequal weight of groups, the hidden aspects of power and the capture of public policy by organised interests mean that a plural society is not necessarily a fair one. Neo-pluralists such as Lindblom and later Dahl accepted much of this and moved to the view that pluralism needs to be accompanied by measures that reduce inequality of resources and bring the unorganised into the process, such as public funding of organisations of the weak, democratisation of the economy and a strong public sector of information. The reply of defenders is that no better alternative has been found, since the concentration of power in a single hand, in the name of equality, has usually led to tyranny.
The distinction between the various meanings of pluralism is necessary to evaluate it. Interest-group pluralism concerns the distribution of power, and it is vulnerable to the empirical criticism of inequality. Cultural and religious pluralism concern the recognition of identities, and are vulnerable to the criticism that they may entrench divisions or give groups power over individuals. Value pluralism is a philosophical claim, which is vulnerable to the criticism that it may lead to relativism, though Berlin and Raz tried to avoid this. Each form needs its own assessment, though the same underlying idea, that unity need not mean uniformity, joins them. The connection with liberalism is also debated: Berlin and Raz make pluralism a support of liberalism, whereas Gray argues that it supports a modus vivendi among different ways of life, which may include illiberal ones.
The Indian experience gives particular weight to the subject. The Constitution accepted diversity and made accommodation a principle of the state, through federalism, secularism, minority rights, reservations and recognition of languages. The result has been, in general, to keep a very large and varied country together under democratic rule, contradicting predictions of its breakup. At the same time, the experience shows the strain: communal violence, caste oppression, regional grievances and the rise of majoritarian politics test the commitment to equal citizenship. The Indian case suggests that pluralism needs, in addition to institutions, a civic culture of tolerance and mutual respect, and a continuing effort to remove the inequalities that prevent groups from standing as equals.
In conclusion, pluralism is best regarded as a basic condition and a continuing task of democracy. As a condition, it recognises that the people to be governed are many and different. As a task, it calls for institutions that spread power, protect the weak, allow the voice of all groups and settle disputes by agreed rules. It is strongest when joined with commitments to equality and justice, so that diversity becomes a source of strength and not of domination.
10. Authors and books for UGC NET
| Author | Book or work | Main idea |
|---|---|---|
| Montesquieu | The Spirit of the Laws (1748) | Division of power; intermediate bodies |
| James Madison | Federalist No. 10 (1787) | Multiplying interests to control faction |
| Alexis de Tocqueville | Democracy in America (1835-40) | Associations as safeguards of liberty |
| J. S. Mill | On Liberty (1859) | Diversity of opinions and ways of life |
| Otto von Gierke | Political Theories of the Middle Age (trans. Maitland, 1900) | Real personality of groups |
| J. N. Figgis | Churches in the Modern State (1913) | Rights of the Church and associations against the state |
| Harold Laski | Authority in the Modern State (1919); A Grammar of Politics (1925) | Denial of absolute sovereignty; state as one association |
| G. D. H. Cole | Social Theory (1920) | Functional associations; guild socialism |
| Ernest Barker | Reflections on Government (1942) | Moderate pluralism; state as coordinator |
| Horace Kallen | Culture and Democracy in the United States (1924) | Cultural pluralism |
| Arthur Bentley | The Process of Government (1908) | Politics as group process |
| David Truman | The Governmental Process (1951) | Interest groups; overlapping membership |
| Robert Dahl | A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956); Who Governs? (1961); Polyarchy (1971) | Polyarchy; dispersed power |
| C. Wright Mills | The Power Elite (1956) | Critique of pluralism; power elite |
| E. E. Schattschneider | The Semisovereign People (1960) | Class bias of group politics |
| Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz | “Two Faces of Power” (1962) | Non-decision-making |
| Steven Lukes | Power: A Radical View (1974) | Three dimensions of power |
| Charles Lindblom | Politics and Markets (1977) | Privileged position of business |
| Isaiah Berlin | Four Essays on Liberty (1969) | Value pluralism |
| John Rawls | Political Liberalism (1993) | Reasonable pluralism; overlapping consensus |
| Chantal Mouffe | On the Political (2005) | Agonistic pluralism |
| William Connolly | Pluralism (2005) | Deep pluralism |
| Will Kymlicka | Multicultural Citizenship (1995) | Group-differentiated rights |
| Bhikhu Parekh | Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000) | Intercultural dialogue |
| Rajeev Bhargava | The Promise of India’s Secular Democracy (2010) | Principled distance; Indian secularism |
| Rajni Kothari | Politics in India (1970) | Congress system; caste and politics |
11. Practice questions
Long answer questions
- Define pluralism and discuss its main features.
- Trace the evolution of pluralist thought from the early English pluralists to neo-pluralism.
- Examine the main types of pluralism: political, legal, cultural, religious and value pluralism.
- Discuss Robert Dahl’s theory of polyarchy and the main criticisms of the pluralist theory of power.
- Examine the relationship between pluralism and democracy.
- Discuss the Indian Constitution as an instrument of managing plurality in India.
Medium answer questions
- Explain the English pluralists’ critique of state sovereignty.
- Explain Isaiah Berlin’s idea of value pluralism.
- Distinguish between pluralism and corporatism.
- What is meant by overlapping memberships?
- Explain neo-pluralism.
- Discuss the problem of group rights and individual rights in a plural society.
Short answer questions
- What is pluralism?
- What is monism?
- What is polyarchy?
- What is meant by the two faces of power?
- What is legal pluralism?
- What is meant by principled distance?
Very short answer questions
- Who wrote The Process of Government?
- Who developed the idea of polyarchy?
- Which thinker is associated with value pluralism?
- Which Articles protect the cultural and educational rights of minorities?
- Who wrote The Semisovereign People?
Objective questions
- The term polyarchy was popularised by: (a) Robert Dahl (b) C. Wright Mills (c) Harold Laski (d) Isaiah Berlin
- The book The Power Elite was written by: (a) Dahl (b) Mills (c) Truman (d) Lindblom
- Which of the following is a pluralist thinker of the early twentieth century? (a) Hobbes (b) Austin (c) Laski (d) Bentham
- The idea of value pluralism is associated with: (a) Berlin (b) Schumpeter (c) Dahl (d) Lukes
- The third dimension of power was described by: (a) Bachrach and Baratz (b) Steven Lukes (c) Schattschneider (d) Mills
- Assertion (A): Pluralism may favour well-organised groups. Reason (R): Groups differ in their resources and capacity to organise. (a) Both A and R are true and R explains A (b) Both are true but R does not explain A (c) A is true but R is false (d) A is false but R is true
- In S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that: (a) Secularism is part of the basic structure (b) Article 356 cannot be used (c) Panchayats are optional (d) Language is a state subject
- Match: (i) Figgis (ii) Truman (iii) Lindblom (iv) Kymlicka with (a) Privileged position of business (b) Group-differentiated rights (c) Churches in the Modern State (d) The Governmental Process. (a) i-c, ii-d, iii-a, iv-b (b) i-a, ii-b, iii-c, iv-d (c) i-b, ii-c, iii-d, iv-a (d) i-d, ii-a, iii-b, iv-c
Analytical prompts
- A government gives special consideration to the demands of a powerful industry association, while the demands of unorganised workers are ignored. Analyse the situation in the light of the criticisms of pluralism.
- A community claims the right to follow its own customs in matters of marriage, though some of them deny equal rights to women. Discuss the conflict between pluralism and equality.
- Compare interest-group pluralism and value pluralism.
- Is Indian federalism a successful example of pluralism in practice? Discuss.
Key takeaways
- Pluralism is the view that society consists of many groups, interests and values, that this diversity is good, and that power should be shared and not concentrated.
- It has descriptive and normative senses, and appears as political, institutional, legal, associational, cultural, religious, moral and economic pluralism.
- Montesquieu, Madison and Tocqueville are its forerunners, and Gierke, Maitland, Figgis, Laski, Cole and Barker formed the early English school that challenged the absolute sovereignty of the state.
- American group theory, represented by Bentley, Truman and Dahl, treats politics as group competition, and Dahl’s polyarchy describes real democracies as systems of competing minorities.
- Critics such as Mills, Schattschneider, Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes and Marxists point to unequal group power and the hidden faces of power, and neo-pluralism admits these.
- Berlin’s value pluralism holds that human values are many, objective and in conflict, and Rawls speaks of the fact of reasonable pluralism, while Mouffe and Connolly develop agonistic and deep pluralism.
- Pluralism supports democracy by dispersing power, moderating conflict and protecting minorities, but it faces problems of inequality, fragmentation, capture and conflict between group and individual rights.
- India accommodates its great diversity through federalism, linguistic states, secularism, minority rights, reservations and special provisions, though communalism, caste oppression and majoritarian trends test it.
Further reading
- Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition
- Robert Dahl, Who Governs?
- David Truman, The Governmental Process
- Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics
- J. N. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State
- Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty
- John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism
- John Rawls, Political Liberalism
- William Connolly, Pluralism
- Chantal Mouffe, On the Political
- Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View
- C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite
- E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People
- Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets
- Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship
- Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism
- Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies
- Rajeev Bhargava, The Promise of India’s Secular Democracy
- Rajeev Bhargava and Ashok Acharya (eds.), Political Theory: An Introduction
- O. P. Gauba, An Introduction to Political Theory
Frequently asked questions
1. What is pluralism? Pluralism is the view that society is made up of many groups, interests and values, that this variety is desirable, and that power should be divided among many centres and not held by one. It is opposed to monism, which holds that there is only one source of authority or truth.
2. What did the English pluralists argue? Writers such as Figgis, Laski, Cole and Barker argued that the state is only one association among many and that its claim to absolute sovereignty is false and dangerous. They held that churches, trade unions and other groups have a life and rights of their own, and that authority should be shared.
3. What is polyarchy? Polyarchy is the term used by Robert Dahl for actual democracies, in which many groups compete for influence and in which citizens have the rights to vote, to be elected, to form associations and to get information from different sources. It is marked by the two dimensions of contestation and inclusiveness.
4. What are the main criticisms of the pluralist theory? Critics say that groups have unequal power, that business and the wealthy dominate, that the unorganised are left out, that some issues are kept off the agenda and that the state may be captured by interests. Neo-pluralists accept many of these points and call for measures to reduce inequalities among groups.
5. What is value pluralism? It is the philosophical view, put forward by Isaiah Berlin, that human values are many, objective and often in conflict, and that no single scale can settle every conflict among them. It leads to a politics of tolerance and of hard choices, and it is opposed to the idea that one doctrine can reconcile all values.
6. How does the Indian Constitution deal with plurality? It provides for a federal structure and linguistic states, the freedom of religion and a secular state, protection of cultural and educational rights of minorities, recognition of languages, reservation for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and special provisions for tribal and some other areas. Together these aim to keep unity along with respect for diversity.
