Justice: Meaning, Theories, Dimensions and the Indian Perspective

Justice is the oldest and most demanding question of political theory. Plato wrote the Republic to answer it, Aristotle placed it at the centre of the Politics, and John Rawls opened A Theory of Justice (1971) by calling it “the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought”. Every political order claims to be just, and every protest against it appeals to justice. Yet people disagree about what it requires. Does it mean giving each person what they deserve? What they have earned or inherited? What they need? An equal share? A fair procedure, whatever the result?

This note explains the meaning, nature, evolution and kinds of justice, sets out the major theories, with a full section on Rawls and his critics, discusses the relation of justice to equality, liberty and rights, and shows how Indian thought and the Constitution have treated it. It ends with guidance for examinations. The topic appears in the undergraduate NEP course in political theory, the postgraduate paper on Political Theory, the OPSC and UPSC optional syllabi and Unit 1 of UGC NET. It should be read with the notes on Equality, Rights, Democracy and Liberalism.

1. Meaning and definitions of justice

1.1 The word

The English word comes from the Latin justitia, from jus, meaning law or right. In Greek the term was dike, and Plato’s word dikaiosyne is often translated as justice or righteousness. In Indian thought the nearest ideas are dharma (right order and right conduct), nyaya (reasoned judgment, and the name of a school of logic) and niti (policy). Amartya Sen, in The Idea of Justice (2009), points out that Indian traditions distinguish niti, the idea of just institutions and rules, from nyaya, the realised justice in the lives of real people, which is a useful pair for understanding the distinction between justice as a perfect arrangement and as the removal of actual injustices.

1.2 Definitions to remember

  • Plato, in the Republic, defines justice as each part doing its own work: in the city, each class performing its proper function, and in the soul, reason ruling over spirit and appetite.
  • Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book V), calls justice a complete virtue in relation to others, and in particular the principle of treating equals equally and unequals unequally, in proportion to their differences.
  • Justinian’s Institutes (sixth century), following Ulpian, define justice as the constant and perpetual will to render to each his due (suum cuique).
  • J. S. Mill, in Utilitarianism (1861), treats justice as the name for certain classes of moral rules that concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly and are therefore of more absolute obligation than any other rules for the guidance of life.
  • John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), describes justice as fairness and as the first virtue of social institutions: laws and institutions, however efficient, must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.
  • Amartya Sen, in The Idea of Justice (2009), says that what moves us is not the realisation that the world falls short of perfect justice, but that there are clearly remediable injustices around us that we want to eliminate.
  • David Miller, in Principles of Social Justice (1999), treats social justice as the way in which the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are distributed among members of society.
  • B. R. Ambedkar held that the three ideals of the French Revolution, liberty, equality and fraternity, must not be treated as separate items; he saw justice as the outcome of their combination, and fraternity as the root of social democracy.

1.3 A working definition

Justice is the principle and practice of giving each person what is due to them, by rules and institutions that are fair, impartial and publicly justified, so that benefits and burdens of social life are shared in a way that people can accept as right. The key words are what is due, fairness, impartiality and public justification.

1.4 Justice compared with related ideas

IdeaConcernDifference from justice
JusticeWhat each is due, fairly determinedThe overarching standard of rightful distribution and treatment
EqualitySameness of treatment, status or shareJustice may allow unequal treatment if it is justified (Aristotle, Rawls)
LibertyFreedom from constraintJustice may limit liberty to protect the liberty of others
RightsProtected claimsRights are specific claims; justice is the wider principle behind them
LawEnacted rulesLaw may be unjust; justice is a standard to criticise law
CharityVoluntary help from generosityJustice is owed as of right; charity is optional
WelfareGeneral well-beingJustice concerns fair shares, not only totals

2. Nature and characteristics of justice: ten points

1. A moral and political ideal. Justice is not a fact that can be read off from nature; it is a standard of what ought to be. We use it to judge laws, institutions and outcomes, and to say that they are right or wrong. Because it is an ideal, it can be used to criticise existing arrangements even when those arrangements are legal and customary, as when reformers called slavery or untouchability unjust.

2. Concerned with what is due to each. At its core, justice answers the question of what each person is owed, whether as a reward, a right, a share of resources or a punishment. The Roman formula suum cuique and Aristotle’s proportionality express this. Different theories define “due” differently: by merit, by need, by equal worth, by entitlement or by agreement.

3. Relational and social. Justice arises among people who live together and whose actions affect each other. A person alone has no questions of justice. This is why Hume called justice an “artificial virtue” that matters in conditions of moderate scarcity and limited generosity, and why Rawls took the basic structure of society as the first subject of justice.

4. Impartial. A just decision does not favour anyone because of who they are. The image of the blindfolded figure of justice, and Rawls’s veil of ignorance, express the idea that rules must be framed and applied without regard to private advantage. Impartiality does not mean ignoring relevant differences; it means treating like cases alike and applying the rules consistently.

5. Universal in claim. Justice is meant to be valid for everyone, not only for a particular group. This is why movements against caste, slavery or apartheid appealed to justice and not merely to interest. Debates on global justice extend the claim beyond the nation-state.

6. Concerned with both outcomes and procedures. A just society must have fair rules (procedural justice) and fair results (distributive justice). A fair trial that convicts an innocent man, or a fair market that leaves many destitute, shows why both are needed. Rawls spoke of pure procedural justice, where any outcome of a fair procedure is just; Nozick defended a purely procedural view of holdings.

7. Historical and contested. Conceptions of justice change over time and differ among cultures. Plato’s hierarchy, medieval natural law, liberal rights and socialist equality are all conceptions of justice. W. B. Gallie described justice as an “essentially contested concept”, one whose proper use involves endless disputes about its meaning.

8. Linked to law but wider than law. Law gives justice institutional form, with courts and rules, but justice is the standard against which law is judged. Natural law thinkers held that an unjust law is no law at all, while positivists such as Hart held that law and morality are distinct. Constitutions such as India’s name justice as an aim, which gives courts a basis to read laws in its light.

9. Requires a balance with other values. Justice must be balanced with liberty, equality, efficiency and community. Rawls’s priority of liberty and the difference principle, and the Indian Constitution’s pairing of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity, show attempts at balance. Where values conflict, justice demands reasoned compromise and not the sacrifice of one value to another.

10. Capable of correction. Because injustice is often visible when perfect justice is unclear, Sen suggests that a theory of justice should help us to reduce clear injustices. Justice thus involves a process of reform, with public reasoning, protest, courts and legislation, and not a once-for-all settlement.

3. Evolution and classical conceptions of justice

3.1 Plato: justice as harmony

In the Republic, Plato’s Socrates is challenged by Thrasymachus, who says that justice is the interest of the stronger, and by Glaucon, who argues that people are just only from fear of punishment (the story of the ring of Gyges). Plato’s reply is that justice is a harmony of the soul and the city. In the ideal city there are three classes: rulers (guardians, with wisdom), auxiliaries (soldiers, with courage) and producers (with moderation). Justice is each class doing its own work and not meddling in another’s. In the soul, reason must govern spirit and appetite. This view has been criticised, notably by Karl Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), as authoritarian, since it allows no equal participation, but it set the terms of the debate.

3.2 Aristotle: distributive and corrective justice

Aristotle, in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, distinguished general justice, which is lawfulness or complete virtue in relation to others, from particular justice, which concerns fair shares. Particular justice has two forms. Distributive justice deals with the allocation of honours, wealth and offices according to a principle of proportionate equality: equals should receive equal shares and unequals unequal shares, in proportion to merit. Disagreement arises because democrats take freedom, oligarchs wealth and aristocrats virtue as the relevant merit (Politics, Book III). Corrective (rectificatory) justice deals with voluntary and involuntary transactions, such as contracts and wrongs, and restores the equality that was disturbed, as a judge does in awarding damages. Aristotle also held that equity (epieikeia) corrects the law where its general rule fails in a particular case.

3.3 Roman law and the natural law tradition

Roman jurists, following the Stoics, held that there is a natural law known to reason and binding on all. Cicero, in De Re Publica, wrote that true law is right reason in agreement with nature. Ulpian’s phrase suum cuique entered Justinian’s code. Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa Theologiae, integrated natural law with Christian theology: human law is just only if it conforms to natural law, and an unjust law is a perversion of law. Natural law remains the basis of the claim that justice stands above positive law.

3.4 The social contract tradition

The social contract thinkers grounded justice in agreement. Hobbes held that justice is the keeping of covenants and arises only with a sovereign who can enforce them. Locke made justice depend on respect for natural rights to life, liberty and property. Rousseau placed it in the general will. Kant, in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), held that justice means that each person’s freedom coexists with the freedom of all according to a universal law, and treated persons as ends, never merely as means. The contract tradition is the direct ancestor of Rawls.

3.5 Hume and the circumstances of justice

David Hume, in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), argued that justice is an artificial virtue that arises from convention. It is needed because resources are moderately scarce and human generosity is limited. In a world of abundance or of perfect benevolence it would not be needed. Rawls adopted these “circumstances of justice”.

3.6 Utilitarian justice

Bentham and Mill held that the right is what maximises happiness. In Utilitarianism (1861), Mill argued that justice has a special force because it protects the vital interests of persons, and that rules of justice are those that utility most strongly supports. Utilitarianism is attractive for its concern with welfare, but critics, Rawls most prominently, say that it does not take seriously the distinction between persons, and may sacrifice some for the benefit of many.

3.7 Modern developments

In the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels criticised bourgeois ideas of justice as reflections of class interest, and socialists demanded distribution by need. In the twentieth century, welfare states put social justice into practice, with Beveridge, Keynes and, later, Rawls providing arguments. After Rawls, the field has produced libertarian, communitarian, feminist, cosmopolitan and capability theories, discussed below.

4. Kinds and dimensions of justice

4.1 Legal justice

Legal justice is the fair administration of law. It requires that laws be general, known in advance and applied equally by independent courts, that no one be punished without a fair trial, and that remedies exist for wrongs. In India, Articles 14, 20, 21 and 22, and the provision for free legal aid (Article 39A), express legal justice. Lon Fuller’s The Morality of Law (1964) listed principles of legality: generality, publicity, non-retroactivity, clarity, consistency, possibility of compliance, stability and congruence between rules and official action.

4.2 Political justice

Political justice means equal political rights and a fair chance to take part in government: universal suffrage, free elections, equal access to office and freedom of association. The Indian Constitution’s guarantee of adult suffrage (Article 326) and the reservation of seats in legislatures and local bodies for disadvantaged groups are instances.

4.3 Social justice

Social justice is concerned with fair relations among social groups and fair access to social goods such as education, health and status, especially for groups that have suffered discrimination. It covers the removal of caste, gender, religious and other forms of exclusion. The abolition of untouchability (Article 17) and reservations in education and public employment (Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4)) are Indian examples. David Miller and Iris Marion Young have written widely on the idea.

4.4 Economic justice

Economic justice concerns fair distribution of income, wealth and opportunities, fair wages and conditions of work, and freedom from exploitation. In the Constitution, it appears in Articles 38 and 39 of the Directive Principles, which call for minimising inequalities, adequate livelihood, equal pay for equal work and prevention of concentration of wealth.

4.5 Distributive justice

Distributive justice asks how benefits and burdens should be shared. The main principles proposed are equality (equal shares), need (to each according to need), merit or desert (according to contribution or virtue), entitlement (according to just acquisition and transfer) and sufficiency (everyone should have enough). Rawls’s difference principle and Nozick’s entitlement theory are the best-known modern answers.

4.6 Procedural justice

Procedural justice concerns the fairness of the process by which decisions are made, regardless of the outcome: the right to be heard, an unbiased decision-maker, reasons for decisions and an opportunity to appeal. In English and Indian administrative law these are the rules of natural justice: nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in his own cause) and audi alteram partem (hear the other side).

4.7 Retributive and restorative justice

Retributive justice holds that wrongdoers deserve punishment in proportion to their offence (Kant, Hegel). Utilitarians justify punishment by deterrence and prevention, and reformists by rehabilitation. Restorative justice focuses on repairing harm through dialogue between victim, offender and community, as in some juvenile justice and community programmes, and in truth and reconciliation commissions such as that of South Africa (1995–2002).

4.8 Global, environmental and intergenerational justice

Global justice asks whether principles of justice extend beyond borders: Charles Beitz, in Political Theory and International Relations (1979), and Thomas Pogge, in World Poverty and Human Rights (2002), argue that they do, while Rawls, in The Law of Peoples (1999), took a narrower view. Environmental justice concerns the fair distribution of environmental burdens, as when polluting industries are placed near poor communities, and the claims of future generations. Intergenerational justice asks what present generations owe to those who will come after, a question central to climate change.

4.9 Comparison

KindCore questionTypical institutionIndian example
LegalAre laws fair and fairly applied?Courts, legal aidArticle 39A; right to fair trial
PoliticalDo all have an equal share in governing?Elections, partiesAdult suffrage; panchayat reservations
SocialAre groups treated as equals?Anti-discrimination lawArticle 17; reservations
EconomicAre income and opportunity fairly shared?Taxation, welfareMGNREGA; Article 39
DistributiveWho gets what?Public policyPublic distribution system
ProceduralWas the process fair?Tribunals, courtsNatural justice rules
Retributive / restorativeWhat response to wrong?Criminal lawJuvenile justice law
Global / environmentalWhat do we owe beyond borders and time?TreatiesClimate agreements

5. Rawls: justice as fairness

John Rawls (1921–2002), in A Theory of Justice (1971), revived social contract theory as an alternative to utilitarianism and made justice the central subject of political philosophy. His later work, Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples (1999) and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), developed and revised the theory.

5.1 The aim and the subject

Rawls wished to find principles of justice that free and equal persons could accept for the basic structure of society: the major political, social and economic institutions that together distribute rights and duties and the benefits of social cooperation. He rejected utilitarianism for treating the sum of satisfaction as all-important and neglecting the separateness of persons.

5.2 The original position and the veil of ignorance

To find fair principles, Rawls imagined an original position, a hypothetical situation in which representatives of citizens choose principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know their class, sex, race, talents, religion, conception of the good or the generation to which they belong, although they know general facts of society, such as that goods are scarce and that people have different aims. Not knowing where they will end up, they must choose principles fair to all. This is the device that gives the theory its impartiality. The parties are assumed to be rational and mutually disinterested, and to want primary social goods such as rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth and the social bases of self-respect.

5.3 The two principles of justice

Rawls argued that the parties would choose two principles, in lexical (serial) order:

  • First principle (equal basic liberties): each person has an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. These include political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of the person, and the right to hold personal property.
  • Second principle: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference principle), and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

The first principle has priority over the second, and fair equality of opportunity has priority over the difference principle. The priority of liberty means that basic liberties may be limited only for the sake of liberty itself and not for greater economic gain.

5.4 The difference principle

The difference principle allows inequalities only if they work to the advantage of the worst off. If higher pay for doctors or entrepreneurs leads to a better position for the poorest than strict equality would, such inequality is just. Rawls treated natural talents as a common asset, since no one deserves their place in the natural lottery, and held that those who are more fortunate may gain only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. The principle is often read as a middle path between libertarian and egalitarian views.

5.5 Maximin and reflective equilibrium

Rawls argued that, in the original position, parties would follow a maximin rule, choosing the arrangement whose worst outcome is better than the worst outcome of any alternative, because they cannot know their position and the stakes are high. Critics, such as John Harsanyi, argued that rational persons would instead maximise expected utility. Rawls’s method of testing his theory is reflective equilibrium: moving back and forth between general principles and considered judgments about particular cases until they fit together.

5.6 Political Liberalism and overlapping consensus

In Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls accepted that a modern society contains many reasonable but conflicting comprehensive doctrines, religious and philosophical, so that his theory cannot rest on one of them. Justice as fairness was recast as a political conception, free-standing and addressed to citizens of a democratic society. It could be supported by an overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines, and public discussion should be conducted by public reason, giving reasons that all citizens can accept as citizens.

5.7 The Law of Peoples

In The Law of Peoples (1999), Rawls extended his ideas to international relations. He proposed that liberal and decent peoples should agree on principles such as independence, treaty observance, respect for human rights and a duty of assistance to burdened societies, but not a global difference principle. Cosmopolitans such as Beitz and Pogge criticised this as too limited.

5.8 Significance

Rawls restored systematic normative theory to political philosophy after decades in which analytic philosophy and behaviouralism had marginalised it. The idea of the veil of ignorance, the priority of liberty and the difference principle have shaped debates on welfare, taxation, education and constitutional law across the world. His influence in India appears in discussions on affirmative action and the idea of the least advantaged, though Indian writers, including Sen, have also questioned how far an ideal theory helps in a society marked by caste.

6. Critics of Rawls

6.1 Nozick: the entitlement theory

Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), argued from a libertarian standpoint that the only justified state is a minimal one, and that justice in holdings depends on how holdings arose, not on any pattern of distribution. His entitlement theory has three principles: justice in acquisition (how unowned things may legitimately be acquired), justice in transfer (how holdings may be legitimately transferred, as by gift or exchange) and rectification of past injustice. If holdings arise from just acquisition and just transfers, then any resulting distribution is just. Patterned principles, such as Rawls’s, require continuous interference with free exchange. Nozick’s famous Wilt Chamberlain example imagines that people freely pay a basketball star a small amount each to watch him play, so that he ends up much richer than others; since everyone consented, the new distribution is just, and to redistribute his income would violate his rights. Taxation of earnings, he said, is on a par with forced labour. Critics, such as G. A. Cohen, reply that the theory ignores unjust initial holdings, that it gives no account of how unowned things may be acquired and that market freedom depends on a framework of property laws.

6.2 Communitarian critics

Michael Sandel, in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), argued that Rawls’s picture of the person in the original position is of an “unencumbered self”, detached from attachments to family, community and tradition, that makes it impossible to explain obligations and identities that we have not chosen. Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue (1981), held that there are no universal standards of justice outside particular traditions of practice. Michael Walzer, in Spheres of Justice (1983), argued that different social goods, such as money, office, education and honour, should be distributed by different principles, appropriate to the shared meanings of each sphere, and that justice is violated when the dominance of one good, such as wealth, spills over into other spheres. Charles Taylor and others made similar points. Rawls replied in Political Liberalism that his theory was political and not metaphysical.

6.3 Marxist and egalitarian critics

Marxists hold that principles of justice reflect the interests of the dominant class and conceal exploitation, and that the proper task is not to find fair distribution within capitalism but to transform the system. G. A. Cohen, an analytical Marxist, in Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008), argued that Rawls’s difference principle permits incentives for the talented that are unjust, since a truly committed egalitarian would not demand them, and that justice should govern personal choices and not only the basic structure. Ronald Dworkin, in Sovereign Virtue (2000), proposed “equality of resources”, in which people are held responsible for their choices but not for their circumstances, using the device of a hypothetical insurance market.

6.4 Feminist critics

Susan Moller Okin, in Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989), argued that Rawls and other liberals ignored the family as a site of injustice. If the parties in the original position do not know their sex, they should be concerned about the division of labour at home, and the theory should apply to the family. Carol Gilligan’s ethic of care and Nancy Fraser’s work on recognition and redistribution add further criticism.

6.5 Hayek: the mirage of social justice

Friedrich Hayek, in Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The Mirage of Social Justice (1976), argued that in a spontaneous market order, outcomes are the results of countless decisions, not of anyone’s intention, so that to call them just or unjust is a category mistake. He held that the pursuit of social justice leads to coercion and loss of liberty.

6.6 Sen: comparative, realisation-focused justice

Amartya Sen, in The Idea of Justice (2009), distinguished the transcendental institutionalism of Rawls and the contract tradition, which tries to identify perfectly just institutions, from a realisation-focused comparison tradition, represented by Adam Smith, Condorcet, Marx and Mill, which asks whether one arrangement is more just than another and how actual lives can be improved. We can agree that slavery is unjust without agreeing on what a perfectly just society looks like. Sen’s own approach centres on capabilities (what people are actually able to do and be), on public reasoning, and on the plurality of reasons of justice, which he illustrated by the story of three children quarrelling over a flute: one claims it because she can play it, another because she has no other toy, and the third because she made it. Each has a reasonable claim, drawn from utilitarian, egalitarian and libertarian traditions. He also used the Indian terms niti and nyaya to make the point.

6.7 Iris Marion Young: structural injustice

Iris Marion Young, in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990), criticised the distributive paradigm for ignoring structures of domination and oppression, and identified five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. Justice, she said, requires attention to decision-making power and cultural recognition and not only to goods. In Responsibility for Justice (2011), she introduced a social connection model for responsibility for structural injustice.

7. Other theories and perspectives on justice

7.1 Utilitarian justice

For Bentham, Mill and later utilitarians such as Henry Sidgwick and R. M. Hare, a just act or rule is one that maximises overall happiness or welfare. Justice has the special force of rules that protect fundamental interests. The strengths of the theory are its concern for consequences and for everyone’s welfare, with each counted as one. The weakness is that it may sanction sacrificing a few for many, or ignoring distribution if total welfare rises.

7.2 Libertarian justice

Libertarians such as Nozick, Hayek and Milton Friedman hold that justice is the protection of individual liberty and property, with a minimal state. Redistribution through taxation is coercive. They stress that market outcomes, arising from free exchange, are not unjust even if unequal.

7.3 Marxist and socialist justice

Marx, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), distinguished the lower phase of communism, in which people are rewarded according to their labour, from the higher phase, in which the principle is “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”. Marx himself was ambivalent about the language of justice, seeing it as part of the ideological superstructure; analytical Marxists such as Cohen, John Roemer and Allen Wood have debated whether Marx thought capitalism unjust. Socialists generally demand equality of condition, public ownership or control of key resources, and distribution by need.

7.4 Communitarian justice

Communitarian thinkers, Walzer, Sandel, MacIntyre and Taylor, see justice as rooted in the shared understandings and practices of a community. Principles are not found behind a veil of ignorance but through interpretation of the social meaning of goods. This approach is sensitive to local culture but may be accused of relativism and conservatism.

7.5 Feminist theories of justice

Feminist thinkers argue that traditional theories have ignored women’s experience and the private sphere. Okin focused on the family; Gilligan and Virginia Held developed the ethic of care; Fraser proposed a three-dimensional view of justice, comprising redistribution (economic), recognition (cultural status) and representation (political voice). Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach has been used to define a list of central capabilities that every society should secure for women and men alike. See also the note on Feminism.

7.6 Capability approach

Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum hold that justice should be judged by the real freedoms people have to achieve valuable functionings. Nussbaum, in Frontiers of Justice (2006) and Creating Capabilities (2011), proposed ten central capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment. A minimum threshold for each is a requirement of justice.

7.7 Global justice

Cosmopolitans such as Peter Singer, in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972), Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge argue that principles of justice apply to all persons and not only to fellow citizens, so that rich countries have duties to the global poor. Pogge in particular argues that the global order imposes harm on the poor. Nationalists and statists, such as David Miller, argue that special duties to compatriots are justified and that global justice requires only sufficiency and fair treatment of others. Rawls’s The Law of Peoples gives a middle position.

7.8 Recognition and difference

Charles Taylor, in “The Politics of Recognition” (1992), and Axel Honneth, in The Struggle for Recognition (1992), argued that justice involves the equal recognition of identities and not only fair shares of goods. Nancy Fraser answered with a framework that joins redistribution and recognition. These debates matter for multiculturalism, gender and caste. See the note on Multiculturalism.

7.9 Comparison

TheoryKey thinkersCore principleRole of the stateMain criticism
UtilitarianBentham, MillMaximise happinessPromote welfareMay sacrifice individuals
RawlsianRawlsEqual liberties; difference principleMaintain a fair basic structureToo abstract; ignores community
LibertarianNozick, HayekEntitlement; free exchangeMinimalIgnores unjust starting points
MarxistMarx, CohenFrom each according to ability, to each according to needTransform class societyUtopian; may neglect liberties
CommunitarianWalzer, SandelShared understandings of goodsExpress community valuesRelativism
FeministOkin, FraserJustice in family and recognitionReshape gender relationsDiversity of views
CapabilitySen, NussbaumReal freedoms and thresholdsEnable capabilitiesHard to measure
GlobalBeitz, PoggeJustice across bordersInternational cooperationWeak enforcement

8. Justice in India

8.1 Dharma, nyaya and the ancient tradition

In the Indian tradition, justice is bound up with dharma, the order that sustains society, and the king’s duty (rajadharma) is to uphold it. The Mahabharata (Shanti Parva) and the Manusmriti describe duties by varna and stage of life, a hierarchical view that later reformers criticised as the source of caste injustice. At the same time, the Buddhist and Jain traditions stressed compassion and non-violence and rejected birth-based hierarchy; Ashoka’s edicts proclaim that all men are his children and speak of fairness in punishment and the welfare of subjects. The Nyaya school developed rigorous reasoning, and Sen draws on its idea of nyaya as the realised justice of actual lives.

8.2 Kautilya

Kautilya’s Arthashastra treats justice as the effective administration of law (dharmasthiya, kantakashodhana) by the king. Courts, rules of evidence and punishment proportionate to offence maintain order, and the ruler’s happiness lies in the happiness of his subjects: “in the happiness of his subjects lies the king’s happiness”. The Arthashastra also provides for the protection of the vulnerable, such as women, children, the aged and the destitute, and for famine relief, which may be read as an early idea of welfare.

8.3 Gandhi: sarvodaya and justice through non-violence

Gandhi held that justice and truth cannot be separated from non-violence, and that means and ends are inseparable. He drew on Ruskin’s Unto This Last, which he paraphrased as Sarvodaya, the welfare of all. His idea of trusteeship asked the rich to hold their wealth in trust for society, and his ideal of antyodaya, the rise of the last person, is a test for policy. He opposed untouchability as a sin and a crime, and called the untouchables Harijans, a term later criticised by Ambedkar and others as patronising. His talisman, quoted in his last notes (1948), asked the reader to recall the face of the poorest and weakest person and ask whether the next step will be of any use to him.

8.4 Ambedkar: justice as liberty, equality and fraternity

B. R. Ambedkar considered caste the great obstacle to justice, as it is a hierarchy of graded inequality, with no fraternity. In Annihilation of Caste (1936) he argued that caste is not merely a division of labour but a division of labourers, that it must be destroyed by breaking the authority of the shastras, and that a good society rests on liberty, equality and fraternity. In Buddha and His Dhamma (1957), he found these in Buddhism. As Chairman of the Drafting Committee, he gave constitutional form to social justice through Articles 15, 16, 17, 46 and the provisions for reservation. He insisted on the need for social and economic democracy to give meaning to political democracy.

8.5 Nehru, Phule and Periyar

Nehru combined civil liberties with socialist planning, speaking of the need to remove poverty and inequality, and the Constituent Assembly’s Objectives Resolution (1946), which he moved, promised justice, social, economic and political. Jotirao Phule, in Gulamgiri (1873), attacked Brahmanical domination and demanded education for the lower castes and for women. E. V. Ramasamy (Periyar) led the Self-Respect Movement, with a radical critique of caste and gender hierarchy. These anti-caste thinkers formed a tradition of social justice that predates the Constitution.

8.6 The Constitution of India

The Preamble secures to all citizens justice, social, economic and political, liberty, equality and fraternity. The following provisions give effect to different aspects of justice:

  • Articles 14–18: equality before law, prohibition of discrimination, equal opportunity in public employment, abolition of untouchability and titles.
  • Articles 15(4), 15(5), 15(6) and 16(4), 16(4A) and 16(6): special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and (by the 103rd Amendment, 2019) economically weaker sections.
  • Article 38: the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, informs all institutions, and to minimise inequalities in income, status, facilities and opportunities.
  • Article 39: principles including adequate means of livelihood, equitable distribution of material resources and prevention of concentration of wealth, equal pay for equal work for men and women.
  • Article 39A: equal justice and free legal aid.
  • Article 46: promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections.
  • Articles 330–342 and Part IX/IXA: reservations in legislatures and local bodies, and the commissions for backward classes.
  • Fifth and Sixth Schedules: protection of tribal areas and people.

8.7 Judicial approach to social justice

In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), the Supreme Court struck down communal reservation in educational admissions, which led to the First Amendment (1951) and Article 15(4). In M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1962), the Court set a ceiling of about fifty per cent on reservations. In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992), the Court upheld the 27 per cent reservation for Other Backward Classes in central government posts, as recommended by the Mandal Commission, while excluding the “creamy layer”, applying the fifty per cent limit and denying reservation in promotions; the 77th Amendment (1995) later added Article 16(4A). In M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006), the Court upheld Article 16(4A) subject to quantifiable data on backwardness. In Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022), the Court upheld the 103rd Amendment on reservation for economically weaker sections by a majority of 3:2.

In other fields, Maneka Gandhi (1978) required that procedure be fair and just; Hussainara Khatoon (1979) held that speedy trial is part of Article 21 and encouraged free legal aid; and PIL has widened access to justice for the poor. See the note on Rights.

8.8 Contemporary Indian scholarship on justice

Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009) and his work with Jean Dreze, An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions (2013), link justice to public services, democracy and capabilities. Rajeev Bhargava and Neera Chandhoke have written on justice in a plural society; Ashwini Deshpande and Satish Deshpande have studied caste and affirmative action. Sukhadeo Thorat and others have measured caste discrimination. Gopal Guru has argued, in the debate on “theorising”, that the experience of Dalits must be a source of theory and not only its object, while Kancha Ilaiah and others have developed Dalit-Bahujan critiques of mainstream accounts.

9. Justice and related concepts

9.1 Justice and equality

Equality is the most closely linked idea. Justice does not always require identical treatment: Aristotle’s “treat equals equally and unequals unequally”, Rawls’s difference principle and affirmative action all allow unequal treatment where it can be justified. Still, formal equality before the law and equal moral worth are basic to most modern theories. Harry Frankfurt, in “Equality as a Moral Ideal” (1987), argued that what matters is not equality but that everyone has enough (sufficientarianism), while Derek Parfit’s “prioritarian” view gives greater weight to benefits to the worse off. See the note on Equality.

9.2 Justice and liberty

Justice and liberty may conflict, as when taxation to support the poor limits the freedom of the rich to spend their earnings, but they may also support each other, since justice protects liberty by equal rights. Rawls’s lexical priority of liberty, Nozick’s side-constraints and Berlin’s pluralism offer different resolutions. Ambedkar insisted that liberty, equality and fraternity are a union, and that to divorce one from the others defeats the purpose of democracy.

9.3 Justice and rights

Rights are the concrete form that justice takes in claims enforceable by law. A just society recognises and protects rights, and rights are used to measure how just a society is. But justice is wider, since it also covers fair procedures, deserts and distribution. See the note on Rights.

9.4 Justice and law

Natural law thinkers hold that unjust law is not true law (lex iniusta non est lex). Legal positivists such as Austin and Hart separate the existence of law from its merits, but accept that a legal system can be criticised on moral grounds. Lon Fuller argued that law has an “inner morality”, and Gustav Radbruch held that extreme injustice is not law, a view that was influential after the Second World War in Germany. The Indian Constitution gives courts the power of judicial review to test laws against fundamental rights.

9.5 Justice and welfare

Welfare policies, such as food security, employment guarantees and pensions, put justice into practice, but justice also asks why people have a claim to welfare. Charity, in contrast, depends on the giver’s choice. The shift from seeing support for the poor as charity to seeing it as a right, as in India’s Right to Food, Right to Work and Right to Education legislation, reflects a move to a justice-based view.

9.6 Social justice and affirmative action

Affirmative action, including reservation in India, affirmative action in the United States and positive discrimination elsewhere, is the most debated application of social justice. Arguments in favour are compensatory justice for historical wrongs, distributive justice for fair access, the value of diversity and representation, and the idea that formal equality is insufficient where structures of disadvantage persist. Arguments against are that it violates merit and individual equality, may benefit the better-off within the group (the creamy layer), may stigmatise beneficiaries, may entrench group identities and may not reach the poorest. Courts and commissions in India have addressed these issues through the creamy-layer exclusion and the fifty per cent ceiling, and debates continue on the extension of reservation, the inclusion of economically weaker sections and the use of caste data.

9.7 Gender justice

Gender justice concerns equality between men and women in law, economy and family, and recognition of other genders. In India it includes the Constitutional guarantees in Articles 14, 15(3) and 16, laws on dowry, domestic violence and workplace harassment, the reservation of seats for women in panchayats (Article 243D) and, by the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, subject to its coming into operation after delimitation. Feminist theorists such as Okin and Fraser stress that justice must reach the household and the cultural sphere.

10. Importance and limitations of justice

10.1 Ten points on the importance of justice

1. It is the basis of legitimate authority. Rulers who act justly gain the consent of the governed, while those who do not must rely on force. Augustine asked what are kingdoms without justice but great robber bands, and Rawls called justice the first virtue of institutions. A state seen as just can count on cooperation and obedience.

2. It secures peace and social order. Conflicts are less likely to lead to violence when people believe that disputes will be settled fairly. Courts and fair procedures turn private grievances into legal claims, and the feeling of injustice is a major cause of rebellion and unrest.

3. It protects the weak against the strong. Without a standard of justice, the strong could do as they pleased. Justice demands that the powerful be bound by the same rules, as Thrasymachus’s opponents argued, and gives the poor and the minority a claim that cannot be brushed aside.

4. It gives a standard for criticising law and policy. Because justice stands above positive law, reformers can appeal to it against unjust laws, as with anti-slavery, anti-apartheid and anti-caste movements. It gives the language of reform.

5. It makes fair cooperation possible. Rawls described society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal persons. People who feel that burdens and benefits are fairly shared are more willing to contribute through taxes, work and law-abiding conduct.

6. It promotes equality and dignity. Justice requires that each person be treated as a person of equal worth, whatever the accident of birth. The ideas of equal basic liberties and equal opportunity put dignity into institutions.

7. It supports economic and social development. Societies with inclusive institutions, fair access to education and health, and trust in the courts do better, as Sen, Acemoglu and Robinson (Why Nations Fail, 2012) have argued in different ways. Injustice wastes talent.

8. It guides distribution of scarce resources. Since resources are limited, rules are needed to decide who gets what. Principles such as need, merit and equality help in setting policy for health, housing and education.

9. It binds past, present and future. Corrective and intergenerational justice require acknowledgment of historical wrongs and care for future generations, which gives politics a moral time-horizon beyond the next election.

10. It is a source of moral unity in plural societies. Where people differ in religion, language and culture, shared principles of justice, such as those in a constitution, offer common ground, which Rawls’s overlapping consensus and Ambedkar’s fraternity both express.

10.2 Ten points on limitations and criticisms

1. The meaning is contested. People differ on what justice requires, and there is no agreed formula. Gallie called it an essentially contested concept; MacIntyre asked, “Whose justice? Which rationality?”, in his 1988 book of that name.

2. Abstract theories may be removed from reality. Rawls’s ideal theory assumes full compliance and a well-ordered society, which may not help to deal with actual injustices. Sen and Charles Mills (Black Rights/White Wrongs, 2017) have argued for non-ideal, realistic approaches.

3. Principles can conflict. Merit and need, equality and liberty, and rights of different groups may point in opposite directions, and there is no mechanical way of resolving them. Walzer’s plural spheres and Sen’s three children illustrate the difficulty.

4. Justice may be used to defend the status quo. Dominant groups present their interests as justice. Marx and later critics argue that principles of justice often reflect class, caste or gender interests, and Plato’s hierarchy illustrates the way inequality can be justified as justice.

5. Procedures can hide unfairness. A formally fair trial or market may favour those with resources. Legal justice is costly, slow and difficult for the poor to reach, a problem in many countries and a main reason for legal aid and Lok Adalats in India.

6. Distributive focus may neglect power and recognition. Young and Fraser argue that treating justice as sharing out goods ignores oppression, decision-making power and cultural respect. Fair shares in an unequal structure may leave domination in place.

7. It may conflict with efficiency and incentives. Redistribution may reduce the incentive to work and invest, as libertarians and some economists argue, though defenders reply that fairness and growth can support each other. Rawls’s difference principle itself tries to link them.

8. It is hard to apply across borders. National institutions provide a setting for justice, but global inequalities and climate harms cross borders, where there is no world government to enforce principles. Cosmopolitans and nationalists disagree about the scope of justice.

9. Implementation depends on institutions and politics. Even clear principles need courts, administration and political will. Laws on land reform, minimum wages or untouchability have often not been enforced, so that justice on paper differs from justice in practice.

10. Over-reliance on courts may weaken democratic politics. If justice is left to judges, critics say, elected bodies may avoid hard choices and democratic debate may be weakened. Others hold that courts are essential defenders of minorities and the poor.

11. Illustrations: justice in action

Distributive justice by different principles. A scholarship awarded on marks follows merit; a food subsidy for poor households follows need; a uniform voting right follows equality; a bonus for extra work follows contribution. The same society uses different principles for different goods, as Walzer argued.

Veil of ignorance. Imagine dividing a cake when the person who cuts it will receive the last slice, without knowing which. The cutter will make the slices as equal as possible. This everyday example is often used to explain Rawls’s device.

Difference principle. A higher salary for surgeons is just under Rawls only if it leads to better medical care that benefits the worst off, for example by drawing talent into the profession and improving public health, and not merely by enriching surgeons.

Entitlement. Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain case, in which fans willingly pay to watch a star player, is the standard illustration of how free exchange may produce unequal but, on his view, just results.

Procedural justice. A government servant dismissed without notice or a hearing has been denied natural justice; Indian courts have quashed such orders for violating the rule audi alteram partem.

Corrective justice. A court ordering compensation to victims of an industrial gas leak, as in the litigation after the Bhopal disaster (1984) and the M. C. Mehta cases on liability for hazardous industry, restores balance between wrongdoer and victim.

Social justice through reservation. Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in education and public employment is intended to correct centuries of exclusion, and is a constant subject of debate over the creamy layer and the ceiling.

Legal aid. A person accused of an offence who cannot afford a lawyer is entitled to free legal aid under Article 39A and Section 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as developed in Hussainara Khatoon (1979) and Khatri v. State of Bihar (1981). The National Legal Services Authority and Lok Adalats carry out the work.

Restorative justice. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered amnesty in return for full disclosure of politically motivated crimes, trying to rebuild relations after apartheid.

Global and environmental justice. The debate over “common but differentiated responsibilities” in climate negotiations, in which developing countries argue that historically high emitters should bear more of the burden, is an example of global distributive justice.

12. Using this topic in examinations

12.1 What each examination expects

ExaminationTypical demandHow to answer
UG (NEP)Define justice; kinds; relation to equality and libertyClear definition, 8–10 points in paragraphs, one or two scholars, one Indian example
PG (MA)Explain Rawls; compare Rawls and Nozick; communitarian critiqueIntroduction, theory in sequence, comparison, criticism, conclusion
OPSCSocial justice in India; reservation; constitutional provisionsConcepts, Articles, cases, statutes, debates, balanced view
UPSC (Political Science optional)Evaluate Rawls and critics; Sen; justice and affirmative actionArgument with scholars, critical analysis, contemporary examples, balanced conclusion
UGC NETMatch scholars with books and ideasQuick recall of authors, titles, years and key concepts

12.2 Practice questions

  1. Define justice. Explain its different kinds. (UG, 10 marks)
  2. Discuss the relationship between justice and equality. (UG, 10 marks)
  3. Explain Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. (PG, 15 marks)
  4. Compare Rawls’s and Nozick’s theories of justice. (PG, 15 marks)
  5. Discuss the communitarian critique of Rawls. (PG/UPSC, 15–20 marks)
  6. “The Indian Constitution is a social document.” Examine how it secures social justice. (OPSC, 20 marks)
  7. Critically evaluate Sen’s distinction between transcendental and comparative approaches to justice. (UPSC, 20 marks)

12.3 Answer outline for question 4

Introduce both as responses to utilitarianism that treat individuals as inviolable, but with different conclusions. Set out Rawls: original position, veil of ignorance, two principles, difference principle and a pattern of fair distribution by the basic structure. Set out Nozick: entitlement theory, three principles, Wilt Chamberlain, minimal state, taxation as forced labour. Compare along the lines of the subject of justice (institutions and pattern versus historical process), the role of the state (welfare versus minimal), view of talents (common asset versus owned), and liberty (priority of basic liberties versus property as a right). Give criticisms of each, such as Cohen’s and Sandel’s, and conclude that the difference between them reflects the larger debate between liberty and equality.

12.4 Sample answer (about 200 words)

Question: Explain Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness.

John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), offered justice as fairness as an alternative to utilitarianism. He asks what principles free and equal persons would choose for the basic structure of society if they were placed in an original position behind a veil of ignorance, knowing nothing of their class, talents, sex or conception of the good. Ignorance of one’s own position ensures impartiality: no one can tailor principles to their own advantage. Rawls argues that rational parties would choose two principles. The first guarantees equal basic liberties to all. The second permits social and economic inequalities only if they are attached to positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity and are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, the difference principle. The first principle has priority over the second. Rawls tests his theory by reflective equilibrium and, in Political Liberalism (1993), recasts it as a political conception supported by an overlapping consensus. Critics include Nozick, who defends entitlement, communitarians like Sandel, who question the unencumbered self, and Sen, who prefers comparing actual injustices to describing a perfect society. Nonetheless, the theory remains the dominant framework in contemporary political philosophy.

12.5 Quick check: ten questions

  1. Who called justice the first virtue of social institutions? (Rawls)
  2. What is the device Rawls used to ensure impartiality? (Veil of ignorance in the original position)
  3. Who wrote Anarchy, State, and Utopia? (Nozick)
  4. Who wrote Spheres of Justice? (Michael Walzer)
  5. What did Sen call Rawls’s approach? (Transcendental institutionalism)
  6. Who developed the idea of five faces of oppression? (Iris Marion Young)
  7. Which of Aristotle’s concepts deals with the restoration of balance after a wrong? (Corrective justice)
  8. Which Article provides for equal justice and free legal aid? (Article 39A)
  9. Which case upheld OBC reservation and the creamy layer exclusion? (Indra Sawhney, 1992)
  10. Who wrote The Mirage of Social Justice? (Hayek)

12.6 Common mistakes to avoid

  • Defining justice only as “equality” or only as “punishment”.
  • Explaining Rawls without the difference principle or the priority of liberty.
  • Mixing up Rawls and Nozick, or attributing the Wilt Chamberlain example to Rawls.
  • Ignoring the Indian dimension, such as Ambedkar, the Preamble, Articles 38, 39 and 46, and reservation cases.
  • Writing the two principles in the wrong order, or forgetting fair equality of opportunity.
  • Confusing Aristotle’s distributive and corrective justice.
  • Ending without a conclusion.

13. Critical analysis (for OPSC and UPSC)

13.1 Strengths of the contemporary debate on justice

The revival of normative theory since Rawls has given political science a rigorous vocabulary for judging institutions. The veil of ignorance provides a test of impartiality; the difference principle offers a way of reconciling incentives with concern for the poor; the critiques by Nozick, Sandel, Okin, Young, Sen and others have exposed what each framework hides. Taken together, they give a richer picture than any single view, and show how justice involves distribution, procedure, recognition and power.

13.2 Weaknesses and criticisms

On Rawls. The original position is a thought experiment that may build in the conclusions it claims to derive; Harsanyi argued that rational choosers would prefer average utility to maximin. The theory takes the nation-state as its unit, so it says little about global poverty. Critics also say that it treats talents and family as arbitrary, and that its stress on a well-ordered society makes it unhelpful for societies marked by deep injustice.

On Nozick. The entitlement theory depends on a just initial acquisition, which is rarely the case. It gives no weight to need and treats property rights as absolute, an assumption that Cohen and others challenged. The argument that taxation is forced labour has been widely criticised.

On communitarians. The charge that liberal theory assumes an unencumbered self overlooks the way Rawls’s later work admits that persons have attachments. Moreover, appeals to community traditions may legitimise hierarchies, as with caste, which is a concern for Indian readers.

On the capability approach. Sen refuses to provide a list of capabilities, which makes the approach hard to use for policy, while Nussbaum’s list is accused of being culturally specific. Measuring capabilities is difficult.

On distributive theories generally. Young and Fraser argue that a focus on the distribution of goods neglects structural domination and cultural recognition. A purely distributive view may miss the way institutions reproduce hierarchies.

13.3 Justice in India: promise and practice

The Indian Constitution is among the most ambitious in its commitment to social justice. It abolishes untouchability, provides for reservation, sets out Directive Principles of economic justice, and gives the Supreme Court the power to enforce rights and to interpret them expansively. PIL, legal aid and the National Legal Services Authority extend access to justice. Sen’s remark that it is the removal of clear injustices that matters fits India, where progress has been made in political representation, school enrolment and legal recognition of rights.

The gap between promise and practice remains large. Crimes against Dalits and women, pendency of large numbers of cases in the courts, the large share of undertrial prisoners in jails, inequality in health and education, and disputes over land and forest rights show that formal justice is not enough. Debates on reservation turn on measurement of backwardness, the creamy layer, the inclusion of new groups and the extension to the private sector. Defenders say that reservation has created a Dalit and OBC middle class and political voice that were not there before; critics say that benefits are uneven and that economic need should be given greater weight; a middle view suggests combining caste and economic criteria. Ambedkar’s warning that political democracy would be hollow without social democracy provides a test for the whole project.

13.4 A model concluding paragraph

Justice is best understood as a family of related claims about what is due to persons: fair procedures, fair shares, equal respect and the removal of oppression. Rawls gave the discussion its modern form with the original position and the two principles; Nozick, the communitarians, feminists, Young and Sen have each shown what his framework leaves out. For India, the writers of the Constitution joined liberty, equality and fraternity with social and economic justice, and Ambedkar’s insistence on fraternity and social democracy still marks the standard. The task is to move from ideal principles to the steady correction of actual injustices, as Sen urges, by public reasoning and by institutions that the poorest can use.

14. Summary table of authors and books (for UGC NET)

AuthorWork (year)Key idea on justice
PlatoRepublicJustice as each class and each part of the soul doing its own work
AristotleNicomachean Ethics (Book V); PoliticsDistributive and corrective justice; proportional equality; equity
CiceroDe Re PublicaNatural law as right reason
Thomas AquinasSumma TheologiaeNatural law; unjust law is a perversion of law
Thomas HobbesLeviathan (1651)Justice as keeping covenants
David HumeA Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40)Circumstances of justice; artificial virtue
Immanuel KantMetaphysics of Morals (1797)Freedom under universal law; persons as ends
J. S. MillUtilitarianism (1861)Justice as rules protecting essential utility
Karl MarxCritique of the Gotha Programme (1875)From each according to ability, to each according to need
Lon FullerThe Morality of Law (1964)Inner morality of law
John RawlsA Theory of Justice (1971); Political Liberalism (1993); The Law of Peoples (1999)Justice as fairness; difference principle; overlapping consensus
Robert NozickAnarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)Entitlement theory
Friedrich HayekThe Mirage of Social Justice (1976)Social justice as a mirage in a market order
Alasdair MacIntyreAfter Virtue (1981); Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988)Justice relative to traditions
Michael SandelLiberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)Critique of the unencumbered self
Michael WalzerSpheres of Justice (1983)Plural principles for distinct social goods
Susan Moller OkinJustice, Gender, and the Family (1989)Justice and the family
Iris Marion YoungJustice and the Politics of Difference (1990)Five faces of oppression; structural injustice
Charles Taylor“The Politics of Recognition” (1992)Recognition and identity
David MillerPrinciples of Social Justice (1999)Need, desert and equality in different relationships
Ronald DworkinSovereign Virtue (2000)Equality of resources
Thomas PoggeWorld Poverty and Human Rights (2002)Global justice; harm by the global order
Nancy FraserScales of Justice (2008)Redistribution, recognition and representation
G. A. CohenRescuing Justice and Equality (2008)Critique of Rawls on incentives
Martha NussbaumFrontiers of Justice (2006); Creating Capabilities (2011)Central capabilities
Amartya SenThe Idea of Justice (2009)Comparative, realisation-focused justice; niti and nyaya
B. R. AmbedkarAnnihilation of Caste (1936); Buddha and His Dhamma (1957)Justice as liberty, equality and fraternity; social democracy
M. K. GandhiHind Swaraj (1909)Sarvodaya; trusteeship; non-violence
KautilyaArthashastraDandaniti; the king’s duty to uphold law and protect subjects

Tip for revision: group the table in four clusters: ancient and medieval (Plato to Aquinas), the contract and utilitarian tradition (Hobbes to Mill), the Rawls debate (Rawls, Nozick, Walzer, Sandel, Sen) and India (Kautilya, Gandhi, Ambedkar). Match each author with exactly one book and one idea.

15. Key takeaways, sources and further study

15.1 Key takeaways

  • Justice is the principle of giving each person what is due by fair, impartial and publicly justified rules and institutions; it is relational, universal in claim, contested and open to correction.
  • Its classical forms are Plato’s harmony, Aristotle’s distributive and corrective justice, natural law, contract theory and utilitarianism.
  • Main kinds: legal, political, social, economic, distributive, procedural, retributive and restorative, and global and environmental.
  • Rawls’s justice as fairness rests on the original position, the veil of ignorance, equal basic liberties and the difference principle. Nozick, communitarians, feminists, Young, Sen and Cohen are his main critics.
  • Sen contrasts the transcendental approach with comparative, realisation-focused justice, using niti and nyaya.
  • India’s tradition runs from dharma and Kautilya through Gandhi’s sarvodaya and Ambedkar’s liberty, equality and fraternity to the Preamble, Articles 14–17, 38, 39, 39A and 46, with reservation and its judicial limits at the centre of the debate.

15.2 Official and open-access sources

15.3 Books and articles for further reading

  1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, revised ed., 1999).
  2. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press, 2001).
  3. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993).
  4. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974).
  5. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Allen Lane, 2009).
  6. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 1982).
  7. Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).
  8. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Basic Books, 1983).
  9. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990).
  10. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (Basic Books, 1989).
  11. David Miller, Principles of Social Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999).
  12. G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press, 2008).
  13. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press, 2000).
  14. Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2006).
  15. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity, 2002).
  16. Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice (Columbia University Press, 2008).
  17. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2002).
  18. B. R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste (annotated critical edition by S. Anand, Navayana, 2014).
  19. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press, 1966).
  20. Rajeev Bhargava and Ashok Acharya (eds.), Political Theory: An Introduction (Pearson, 2008).

15.4 Editorial note

This note was prepared by the PoliPrepHub editorial team for educational use, drawing on the primary works, constitutional texts and standard textbooks listed above. It is not legal advice. Case names, years and holdings should be checked against the judgments and your prescribed texts before they are used in an examination, since judicial doctrine and reservation law change with later decisions and amendments. Corrections are welcome through the Contact page. See also our Disclaimer.

15.5 Frequently asked questions

What is justice? The principle of giving each person what is due to them by fair, impartial rules and institutions, so that the benefits and burdens of social life are shared in a way people can accept as right.

What is the veil of ignorance? Rawls’s device in which people choose principles of justice without knowing their own class, talents, sex or conception of the good, so that the principles chosen are impartial.

What is the difference principle? The principle that social and economic inequalities are just only if they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.

How does Sen differ from Rawls? Sen argues that we should compare actual arrangements and remove clear injustices instead of searching for a perfectly just set of institutions, and he judges justice by capabilities and not primary goods.

How does the Indian Constitution secure justice? Through the Preamble’s promise of social, economic and political justice, Fundamental Rights such as Articles 14–17, Directive Principles in Articles 38, 39, 39A and 46, reservations, and judicial review.

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