Before discussing the limits of structural realism, a balanced answer must first show what it explains well. South Asia has many features that look like a textbook realist world: two enduring rivalries, repeated wars, arms races, nuclear weapons, alliances with outside powers and a weak regional institution. Many scholars and policymakers in the region think in realist terms. This topic examines how far realist concepts help us understand South Asian security.
How to apply the theory
Structural realism predicts that, in an anarchic system, states will:
- Rely on self-help and build military power.
- Balance against stronger or threatening states, internally (arming) and externally (alliances).
- Get trapped in security dilemmas and arms races.
- Care about relative gains, which makes cooperation difficult.
- Be shaped by the distribution of power (polarity) in the wider system.
- Be deterred from major war by nuclear weapons (Waltz’s view).
- If powerful, seek regional dominance (Mearsheimer’s offensive realism).
The rest of these notes test each prediction against South Asian evidence.
Why realism appeals in South Asia
- Historical experience: Partition, wars and territorial disputes make security a matter of survival.
- Strategic culture: Kautilya’s realpolitik, Nehru’s mix of idealism and realism, and Pakistan’s India-focused security thinking.
- Policy practice: governments in the region often justify defence spending, alliances and nuclear weapons in realist terms (deterrence, balance, national interest).
- Scholarship: many Indian and Pakistani strategic analysts (for example, K. Subrahmanyam, often called the doyen of Indian strategic thinking, and C. Raja Mohan) use realist frameworks.
Anarchy, Self-help and Militarisation
Absence of a regional authority
- South Asia has no regional institution with authority over its members. SAARC excludes bilateral and contentious issues and has not held a summit since 2014.
- The United Nations has had limited impact: the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP, since 1949) monitors the ceasefire line, but UN resolutions on Kashmir were never implemented, and India rejects third-party mediation since the Simla Agreement (1972).
- This fits Waltz’s idea of anarchy: no higher authority can protect states or enforce agreements.
Self-help behaviour
- High defence spending: India is one of the world’s largest military spenders and arms importers; Pakistan spends a large share of its budget on defence despite economic crises.
- Large standing armies: India and Pakistan maintain some of the world’s largest armed forces; Sri Lanka’s army expanded greatly during its civil war.
- Self-reliance in arms: India’s indigenous defence production (DRDO, “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” in defence) and Pakistan’s joint production with China (JF-17 aircraft) reflect the self-help logic of reducing dependence on others.
- Nuclear weapons: both India and Pakistan justified their nuclear programmes as the ultimate guarantee of survival in a self-help world. Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously said Pakistanis would “eat grass” to make the bomb.
- Mistrust of agreements: India’s experience of 1962 (when the Panchsheel agreement of 1954 did not prevent war) taught Indian leaders not to rely on promises alone, a lesson often summarised as “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” turning into betrayal.
Assessment
The absence of effective regional institutions and the high level of military preparation strongly support the realist picture of anarchy and self-help.
Balance of Power: Internal and External Balancing
Balance of power is the core prediction of structural realism, and South Asia offers many examples.
Pakistan’s balancing against India
Pakistan, much smaller than India, has consistently tried to balance Indian power.
- External balancing:
- USA: Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (1954), SEATO (1954), CENTO (1955); frontline state in the Afghan war (1980s); “major non-NATO ally” (2004).
- China: the “all-weather friendship” from the 1960s (border agreement, 1963); help with nuclear and missile programmes; CPEC; China is now Pakistan’s main arms supplier.
- Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: financial support and, since September 2025, a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement.
- Turkey and other partners for diplomatic and defence support.
- Internal balancing:
- Building a large army relative to its size.
- The nuclear programme (after 1971 and especially after India’s 1974 test) to offset India’s conventional superiority.
- Tactical nuclear weapons (such as the Nasr missile, first tested in 2011) to counter India’s “Cold Start” doctrine of rapid limited offensives.
India’s balancing
- Against China and the USA–Pakistan axis (1960s–1980s): India moved closer to the Soviet Union, culminating in the Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), which balanced the US–China–Pakistan alignment during the Bangladesh war.
- Against China (2000s onward): closer ties with the USA (civil nuclear deal, defence agreements), Japan, Australia and France; the Quad; the Malabar naval exercise.
- Internal balancing: nuclear weapons (1974, 1998), missile programmes (Agni series), military modernisation, border infrastructure on the LAC, and naval expansion in the Indian Ocean.
- Strategic autonomy: India avoids formal alliances, preferring flexible partnerships; realists describe this as soft balancing or hedging.
Summary table
| Actor | Main threat perceived | Internal balancing | External balancing |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pakistan | India | Army build-up; nuclear weapons; tactical nuclear weapons | USA (Cold War, post-9/11); China; Saudi Arabia |
| India | China and the China–Pakistan axis | Nuclear weapons; missiles; military modernisation; border infrastructure | USSR (1971); USA, Japan, Australia (Quad); France |
| China (as a regional actor) | India’s rise; US influence | Military modernisation | Pakistan as a counterweight to India |
Assessment
The repeated pattern of Pakistan aligning with outside powers against India, and India aligning against China, strongly supports Waltz’s prediction that balances of power recur in an anarchic system.
Balance of Threat: How Smaller States Respond
Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory explains the behaviour of India’s smaller neighbours better than a simple balance of power. For them, India is threatening because of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and, at times, perceived intentions (interventions in Sri Lanka 1987, Maldives 1988, the Nepal blockades of 1989 and 2015).
Three strategies
| Strategy | Meaning | South Asian examples |
|---|---|---|
| Balancing | Aligning with others against the threatening power | Pakistan with China and the USA; Nepal and Sri Lanka at times leaning towards China |
| Bandwagoning | Aligning with the stronger, nearby power | Bhutan’s close alignment with India (1949 Treaty; revised 2007); Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024) |
| Hedging | Keeping ties with several powers to avoid full dependence on one | Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh balancing India and China; India itself between the USA, Russia and China |
Country examples
- Nepal: the “yam between two boulders” (Prithvi Narayan Shah). After the 2015 blockade, Nepal signed transit and BRI agreements with China to reduce dependence on India.
- Sri Lanka: accepted Chinese loans and investment (Hambantota, Colombo Port City) while keeping ties with India; after the 2022 crisis, India’s emergency aid restored some influence.
- Maldives: swung from Yameen’s pro-China policy to Solih’s “India First” and then to Muizzu’s “India Out” campaign, before seeking balance again.
- Bangladesh: after 2024, the interim government reached out to China and Pakistan; the new BNP government (2026) is expected to pursue a more balanced foreign policy.
- Bhutan: the clearest case of bandwagoning with India, due to geography (landlocked between India and China), economic dependence (hydropower) and fear of China after Tibet (1950) and the merger of Sikkim with India (1975) reminded it of its vulnerability.
Assessment
Walt’s theory explains why small neighbours fear the nearer power (India) more than the distant one (China) and why they hedge. It also explains why Bhutan, facing China directly, bandwagons with India. This is one of the strongest applications of realist ideas to South Asia.
Security Dilemma and Arms Races
The security dilemma (Herz, Jervis) is clearly visible in South Asia: measures one state takes for its own security make its rival feel less secure, leading to a cycle of reaction.
The strategic chain: China → India → Pakistan
South Asia’s arms competition is not just bilateral; it is a chain or “security trilemma”:
- China’s nuclear test (1964), coming soon after the 1962 war, pushed India to develop a nuclear option.
- India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” (Pokhran-I, 1974) pushed Pakistan to accelerate its own programme (A.Q. Khan, Kahuta).
- India’s 1998 tests (Pokhran-II, justified mainly by the China threat in Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton) were followed within weeks by Pakistan’s tests at Chagai.
- India builds capabilities against China (long-range Agni missiles, naval forces); Pakistan sees these as threats to itself and responds; China supports Pakistan to keep India occupied.
Examples of action and reaction
| Area | India’s move | Pakistan’s or China’s response |
|---|---|---|
| Nuclear tests | 1974 and 1998 tests | Pakistan’s 1998 tests |
| Missiles | Prithvi and Agni series; missile defence | Ghauri, Shaheen and Babur missiles; MIRV development |
| Doctrine | “Cold Start” (proactive limited offensive, from around 2004) | Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons (Nasr) and “full spectrum deterrence” |
| Border | Infrastructure on the LAC after Doklam and Galwan | China’s “xiaokang” border villages and roads |
| Maritime | Naval expansion; Andaman and Nicobar Command | China’s ports and naval deployments; Pakistan’s naval nuclear capability |
| Alliances | Quad, defence agreements with the USA | Deeper China–Pakistan military cooperation |
Why the dilemma is sharp in South Asia
- Geography: short distances and short missile flight times (a few minutes between India and Pakistan) leave little time to judge intentions.
- Offence-defence ambiguity (Jervis): missiles and aircraft can be used for both, so every new system looks threatening.
- History of war and mutual distrust make the worst-case assumption seem reasonable.
Assessment
The arms race and the action–reaction chain among China, India and Pakistan are among the clearest confirmations of realist theory in the region.
Nuclear Deterrence and the Absence of Major War
Kenneth Waltz argued that nuclear weapons make major war irrational and therefore promote stability. South Asia provides important evidence for this argument (details of deterrence theory are studied in Unit III).
Evidence supporting the realist view
- No full-scale war since 1971: India and Pakistan fought three major wars before they had nuclear weapons (1947–48, 1965, 1971). Since both acquired nuclear capability (covertly in the late 1980s, openly in 1998), there has been no full-scale war.
- Crises stayed limited: Kargil (1999), the 2001–02 standoff, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 surgical strikes, the 2019 Balakot strike and the May 2025 conflict were all limited in time and scope. In each case, both sides avoided all-out war, and the 2025 fighting ended with a ceasefire after about four days.
- Restraint in practice: India did not cross the LoC during Kargil; India’s responses after 2016 were deliberately calibrated as “non-escalatory” strikes on terrorist targets.
- Scholarly support: Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (2005), argued that nuclear deterrence helped prevent crises from becoming wars. Waltz himself applied his “more may be better” argument to South Asia in his debate with Scott Sagan (The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 and later editions).
- Nuclear CBMs: the agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear installations (1988) and the pre-notification of ballistic missile tests (2005) show rational, deterrence-based management.
India–China
- Since both are nuclear powers with no-first-use policies, the India–China border clashes (Doklam 2017, Galwan 2020) were fought without firearms under old agreements and stayed limited, which some realists see as evidence of mutual deterrence.
Assessment
The absence of full-scale war since 1971, and the limited nature of crises since 1998, support the realist deterrence argument. However, the frequency of crises and the risk of escalation (the stability-instability paradox) are important counter-arguments, examined in the next topic and in Unit III.
Polarity, Great Powers and Regional Hegemony
Polarity shapes regional alignments
Structural realism holds that the distribution of power in the global system shapes the behaviour of regional states. South Asian alignments have closely followed changes in global polarity.
| Global structure | Period | Effect on South Asia |
|---|---|---|
| Bipolarity (USA vs USSR) | 1947–1991 | Pakistan aligned with the USA; India moved towards the USSR; South Asian rivalry became part of the Cold War |
| Unipolarity (US dominance) | 1991–around 2008 | India liberalised and moved closer to the USA; the USA mediated in crises (Kargil 1999) and led the war in Afghanistan |
| Emerging bipolarity or multipolarity (USA vs China, with Russia, India and others) | 2008 onward | India aligns with the USA, Japan and Australia against China (Quad); Pakistan deepens ties with China; smaller states hedge between India and China |
- Assessment: the way South Asian states have changed partners as the global structure changed is strong evidence for the systemic logic of Waltz’s theory. As the structure changed, regional states adjusted their alignments.
Great-power penetration
- Buzan and Wæver describe South Asia as a regional security complex “penetrated” by outside powers. Realists explain this as great powers seeking to balance each other through regional partners (the USA using Pakistan against the USSR; China using Pakistan against India; the USA using India against China).
India’s search for regional primacy (offensive realism)
- Mearsheimer’s offensive realism predicts that a strong state will try to become the regional hegemon and keep other great powers out of its region.
- India’s behaviour often fits this:
- The Indira Doctrine, sometimes called India’s “Monroe Doctrine”: outside powers should not interfere in South Asia.
- Interventions in East Pakistan (1971), Sri Lanka (1987) and Maldives (1988), and the merger of Sikkim (1975).
- Special treaties with Bhutan (1949) and Nepal (1950) inherited from British India’s frontier policy.
- Concern about China’s presence in neighbouring states and the Indian Ocean.
- Limits: India has also followed restraint, non-alignment and the Gujral Doctrine; it has not been able to stop China’s growing role. Some scholars describe India as a “reluctant” or “incomplete” regional hegemon.
China and power transition
- Power transition theory (Organski) and offensive realism see the rise of China as the main structural change in Asia. China’s growing power, and the gap between Chinese and Indian capabilities, explain India’s balancing with the USA and the intensification of India–China competition in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
Relative Gains and the Limits of Cooperation
Structural realists (Waltz, Grieco) argue that states care about relative gains (who gains more) and fear dependence, so cooperation is difficult even when all would benefit. South Asia’s very weak regional cooperation fits this view.
Evidence
- SAARC’s failure: the organisation has been paralysed by India–Pakistan rivalry; no summit has been held since 2014. Security issues were excluded from its agenda from the start.
- Low intra-regional trade: South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world; intra-regional trade is only around 5 per cent of the region’s total trade. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA, 2004) has had limited impact.
- India–Pakistan trade: Pakistan never granted India Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, partly fearing that India would gain more; India withdrew MFN status for Pakistan in 2019 after the Pulwama attack. Trade has been almost suspended since 2019.
- Water cooperation under strain: the Indus Waters Treaty survived three wars but was put “in abeyance” by India in 2025, showing how security concerns override cooperation.
- Connectivity projects: India refused to join China’s BRI, partly because CPEC passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir and partly because China would gain more influence. Smaller states’ welcome of BRI is watched by India in relative terms.
- Fear of dependence: smaller neighbours worry that economic integration with India would increase India’s leverage over them (for example, Nepal’s dependence on Indian transit routes, shown by the 2015 blockade).
Assessment
The persistent failure of regional cooperation, despite large potential gains from trade, energy and water sharing, is well explained by the realist logic of relative gains, mistrust and fear of dependence.
Overall Assessment
| Realist concept | Evidence from South Asia | How well it explains |
|---|---|---|
| Anarchy and self-help | No effective regional authority; high defence spending; nuclear weapons | Strong |
| Balance of power | Pakistan’s alliances with the USA, China and Saudi Arabia; India’s ties with the USSR, then the USA and the Quad | Strong |
| Balance of threat | Smaller states fear nearby India; hedging with China; Bhutan bandwagons | Strong |
| Security dilemma and arms race | China–India–Pakistan nuclear and missile chain; Cold Start vs tactical nuclear weapons | Strong |
| Nuclear deterrence | No full-scale war since 1971; limited crises since 1998 | Partial: no major war, but frequent crises |
| Polarity | Alignments changed with the Cold War, unipolarity and US–China rivalry | Strong |
| Regional hegemony | Indira Doctrine; interventions; concern about China | Partial: India’s primacy is incomplete and contested |
| Relative gains | Failure of SAARC and SAFTA; trade restrictions; IWT in abeyance | Strong |
Conclusion
Structural realism explains a great deal about South Asian security, especially at the level of relations between states. The recurring balancing by Pakistan and India, the arms race and security dilemma among China, India and Pakistan, the influence of global polarity on regional alignments, the hedging of smaller states, the failure of regional cooperation and the absence of full-scale war under nuclear deterrence all fit realist predictions.
However, realism explains patterns of behaviour better than their causes and content. It does not explain why the India–Pakistan rivalry is so deeply tied to identity and ideology, why the most frequent violence comes from non-state actors and internal insurgencies, why domestic politics (such as the Pakistani army’s role) shapes security policy, or why non-traditional threats (migration, water, climate) matter so much. These gaps are the subject of the next topic: the limits of structural realism in South Asia.
Quick Revision
| Item | Key fact |
|---|---|
| Pakistan’s US alliances | Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and SEATO (1954); CENTO (1955); major non-NATO ally (2004) |
| China–Pakistan border agreement | 1963 |
| Indo-Soviet Treaty | August 1971 |
| China’s first nuclear test | 1964 |
| India’s nuclear tests | 1974 (Pokhran-I); 1998 (Pokhran-II) |
| Pakistan’s nuclear tests | May 1998 (Chagai) |
| Cold Start doctrine | Around 2004 |
| Nasr tactical nuclear missile | First tested 2011 |
| Agreement on non-attack of nuclear installations | 1988 |
| India withdraws MFN for Pakistan | 2019 |
| Fearful Symmetry | Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty (2005) |
| The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate | Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz (1995) |
One-line memory aids
- Balancing: Pakistan with USA/China/Saudi Arabia; India with USSR, then USA/Quad.
- Bandwagoning: Bhutan with India. Hedging: Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh.
- Strategic chain: China → India → Pakistan.
- India’s “Monroe Doctrine”: the Indira Doctrine.
Exam Practice
Long-answer questions
- How far does structural realism explain the security behaviour of South Asian states?
- Discuss the India–Pakistan rivalry in the light of balance of power theory.
- Explain the “security dilemma” and the China–India–Pakistan strategic chain.
- Has nuclear deterrence brought stability to South Asia? Discuss from a realist perspective.
- Apply Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory to the foreign policies of India’s smaller neighbours.
- How have changes in global polarity affected alignments in South Asia?
- Is India a regional hegemon? Examine in the light of offensive realism.
Short-answer questions
- External balancing
- Bandwagoning
- Hedging
- Security trilemma
- Cold Start doctrine
- Full spectrum deterrence
- Indira Doctrine
- Penetrated regional system
- Relative gains
- Fearful Symmetry
MCQs (UGC-NET / OPSC style)
- Pakistan joined SEATO in:
- (a) 1950 (b) 1954 (c) 1962 (d) 1971
- Answer: (b)
- Which South Asian country is the clearest example of bandwagoning with India?
- (a) Nepal (b) Sri Lanka (c) Bhutan (d) Maldives
- Answer: (c)
- Fearful Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons was written by:
- (a) Sagan and Waltz (b) Ganguly and Hagerty (c) Cohen and Dasgupta (d) Paul and Kapur
- Answer: (b)
- Pakistan’s Nasr missile is associated with:
- (a) Strategic deterrence against China (b) Tactical nuclear response to Cold Start (c) Missile defence (d) Space programme
- Answer: (b)
- The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in:
- (a) 1962 (b) 1965 (c) 1971 (d) 1974
- Answer: (c)
- India’s “Monroe Doctrine” for South Asia usually refers to:
- (a) Gujral Doctrine (b) Indira Doctrine (c) Panchsheel (d) Look East Policy
- Answer: (b)
- Match the following:
- A. Pokhran-I – 1. 1998
- B. Chagai tests – 2. 1974
- C. China’s first nuclear test – 3. 1964
- D. Non-attack of nuclear installations agreement – 4. 1988
- Answer: A-2, B-1, C-3, D-4
- Assertion (A): Regional cooperation through SAARC has been weak. Reason (R): India and Pakistan are concerned about relative gains and mutual security.
- Answer: Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.
- Which theory best explains why India’s smaller neighbours fear India more than distant China?
- (a) Balance of power (b) Balance of threat (c) Democratic peace (d) Complex interdependence
- Answer: (b)
- Which of the following is an example of internal balancing?
- (a) Joining the Quad (b) Signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty (c) Developing the Agni missile series (d) Joining CENTO
- Answer: (c)
Suggested readings
- Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry.
- T.V. Paul (ed.), The India–Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry.
- Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate.
- Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
- C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy.
- Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers.



