Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Risk Reduction in South Asia

The previous topics showed that nuclear deterrence in South Asia has prevented full-scale war but has not produced robust stability. This raises a practical question: what can be done to manage the nuclear danger? The answers fall under four related ideas – disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and risk reduction. Students often confuse these terms, so they must be clearly distinguished.

Key concepts

Disarmament

  • Disarmament means the reduction or complete elimination of weapons.
  • Nuclear disarmament aims at a world free of nuclear weapons (“global zero”).
  • India has historically been a strong champion of universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable disarmament, for example through Nehru’s call for a halt to nuclear testing (1954) and the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (1988) for elimination of nuclear weapons by 2010.

Non-proliferation

  • Non-proliferation means stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to new states (horizontal proliferation) and, in a wider sense, limiting the growth of existing arsenals (vertical proliferation).
  • The core of the global regime is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), supported by IAEA safeguards, export control groups, and the CTBT.

Arms control

  • Arms control does not aim to abolish weapons. It aims to manage them: to limit numbers or types, restrain competition and make war less likely.
  • The classic definition by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin (Strategy and Arms Control, 1961) says arms control covers all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies aimed at reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the costs of preparing for it.
  • Cold War examples: SALT I and the ABM Treaty (1972), INF Treaty (1987), START (1991), New START (2010; expired February 2026).

Risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBMs)

  • These are practical steps to reduce the chance of accidental, unauthorised or inadvertent nuclear use and to prevent misunderstanding: hotlines, advance notice of tests, agreements not to attack certain targets, data exchanges.
  • CBMs do not limit weapons. They aim to build transparency, predictability and trust.

Why these issues matter in South Asia

  • India and Pakistan are among the four nuclear-armed states outside the NPT (with Israel and North Korea).
  • Both are expanding and modernising their arsenals (SIPRI estimates for January 2026: India about 190 warheads, Pakistan about 170).
  • There is no bilateral arms control treaty that limits their weapons. Only a few CBMs exist.
  • The 2025 crisis showed that existing measures are thin compared with the speed of modern escalation.

Different national approaches

PointIndiaPakistan
Main frameGlobal disarmament and non-discrimination; China must be includedRegional (India-specific) restraint and balance
Arms control preferenceGlobal, step-by-step, multilateral (Conference on Disarmament)Bilateral “Strategic Restraint Regime” with India
View of the regimeWants recognition as a responsible nuclear state; seeks NSG entryWants equal treatment with India; opposes “discrimination”
Key concernChina’s arsenal and growing gapIndia’s conventional and strategic superiority

This difference in framing – global versus regional – is the single most important reason why South Asian arms control has made so little progress.

India, Pakistan and the Global Non-proliferation Regime

The NPT (1968)

  • The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970. It was extended indefinitely in 1995.
  • It recognises only five nuclear weapon states (NWS) – the US, USSR/Russia, UK, France and China – those that had tested before 1 January 1967. All others must join as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).
  • Its three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament (Article VI), and peaceful use of nuclear energy (Article IV).

India’s position

  • India refused to sign the NPT, calling it discriminatory – it created a system of “nuclear haves and have-nots” (often called “nuclear apartheid”, a term used by Jaswant Singh).
  • India argued that the treaty did not bind the NWS to time-bound disarmament.
  • China’s nuclear test in 1964 and its recognition as an NWS made the treaty unacceptable to India’s security.
  • India has said it cannot join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Pakistan’s position

  • Pakistan has said it will sign the NPT only if India does. Its policy has been linked to India’s throughout.

The CTBT (1996)

  • The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions. It has not entered into force because certain states (listed in Annex 2) have not ratified it, including India and Pakistan.
  • In 1996 India blocked the treaty text at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, objecting to the entry-into-force clause (which required India’s ratification) and the lack of a disarmament timeline.
  • After the 1998 tests, both India and Pakistan announced a voluntary moratorium on further testing, which they have kept.

The FMCT

  • A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would ban the production of fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for weapons.
  • The CD agreed on a negotiating mandate in 1995 – the Shannon Mandate (CD/1299).
  • Pakistan has blocked negotiations at the CD (consensus-based) since around 2009, arguing that a treaty must also cover existing stocks, otherwise it would freeze India’s advantage.
  • India supports FMCT negotiations on the basis of the Shannon Mandate. India restated this at the CD’s high-level segment in February 2026.

The 1998 tests and the international response

  • The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1172 (June 1998), condemning the tests and calling on both states to stop their programmes and join the NPT and CTBT.
  • The US imposed sanctions under the Glenn Amendment. Japan and others also imposed sanctions.
  • The Jaswant Singh–Strobe Talbott talks (1998–2000) were 14 rounds of dialogue that helped India explain its policy and paved the way for better relations.
  • Sanctions were lifted after 9/11 (2001), as both states became important to the US.

The Indo-US civil nuclear deal and the NSG waiver

This is the most important change in India’s position in the regime.

  • 18 July 2005: Joint Statement of PM Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush.
  • 2006: India agreed to separate civil and military nuclear facilities; the US Congress passed the Hyde Act.
  • 2008: the 123 Agreement was signed; the IAEA approved an India-specific safeguards agreement; and on 6 September 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) gave India a “clean waiver” allowing civil nuclear trade.
  • India made commitments: continue the testing moratorium, keep civil facilities under safeguards, maintain strict export controls, support FMCT. India also ratified the Additional Protocol in 2014.

Significance

  • India was accepted as a de facto responsible nuclear state outside the NPT.
  • Critics said it weakened the NPT and freed India’s domestic uranium for weapons.
  • Pakistan objected strongly, calling it discriminatory and arguing that it upset the strategic balance. It sought a similar deal, which was not given, partly because of the A. Q. Khan network. China’s civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan (Chashma and Karachi reactors) continued.

Export control regimes

RegimePurposeIndiaPakistan
NSG (1974, formed after India’s 1974 test)Nuclear exportsApplied 2016; blocked by lack of consensus, mainly ChinaApplied 2016; not admitted
MTCRMissiles and dronesMember since 2016Not a member
Wassenaar ArrangementConventional arms and dual-use goodsMember since 2017Not a member
Australia GroupChemical and biological itemsMember since 2018Not a member
Hague Code of ConductBallistic missilesJoined 2016Not a member
  • China says NSG membership for non-NPT states needs a common, criteria-based approach, and that Pakistan should be considered alongside India.
  • Pakistan says it should be treated equally with India.

Other treaties

  • Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, 2017): neither India nor Pakistan has joined, like all nuclear-armed states.
  • Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): both are members. India declared and destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile (completed 2009).
  • Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): both are members. India hosted a conference marking its 50th anniversary in December 2025.

The global context in 2026

  • New START expired in February 2026, leaving no treaty limits on US and Russian forces for the first time in decades.
  • China is expanding its arsenal rapidly.
  • At the CD in February 2026, India warned of a new arms race and called for strategic stability. A weak global regime makes regional arms control in South Asia even harder.

Bilateral CBMs and Nuclear Risk Reduction

Since there is no arms control treaty between India and Pakistan, confidence-building measures (CBMs) are the main tools of risk reduction. They fall into conventional, nuclear and political categories.

Major agreements

YearMeasureMain content
1971DGMO hotlineDirect communication between military operations chiefs; used weekly and in crises
1988 (in force 1991)Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and FacilitiesNeither side will attack the other’s nuclear facilities; lists exchanged every 1 January (since 1992)
1991Advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movementsReduces fear of surprise attack
1991Prevention of airspace violationsRules for military aircraft near the border
1992Joint Declaration on Chemical WeaponsBoth renounce chemical weapons
1999Lahore Declaration and MoUConsult on nuclear doctrines; notify missile tests; reduce risk of accidental use; keep test moratorium
2003LoC ceasefireCeasefire along LoC and IB; recommitted February 2021
2004 onwardsExpert-level talks on nuclear CBMsHeld under the Composite Dialogue; stalled after 2008
2005Pre-notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic MissilesAdvance notice of ballistic missile tests (not cruise missiles)
2007Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear WeaponsInform each other of nuclear accidents; extended every five years

The Non-Attack Agreement: the most durable CBM

  • Signed on 31 December 1988 by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto; it came into force in January 1991.
  • It has been implemented every year without fail, even during Kargil, Twin Peaks and after 2025. On 1 January 2026 the two countries again exchanged lists, despite frozen ties.
  • Limitation: it covers listed facilities, not population centres or deployed forces, and the lists are not verified.

Lahore Declaration (February 1999)

  • Signed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif during the Lahore bus journey.
  • The MoU committed the two sides to discuss nuclear doctrines, give advance notice of missile tests, and take measures against accidental or unauthorised use.
  • Significance: it was the first attempt at a nuclear dialogue after the tests, but Kargil soon followed, damaging trust.

Testing the CBMs: the BrahMos accident (March 2022)

  • On 9 March 2022 an Indian BrahMos cruise missile was fired accidentally during routine maintenance and landed near Mian Channu in Pakistan. No one was killed.
  • India called it a technical malfunction, expressed regret, and later dismissed three officers.
  • Pakistan complained that India did not use the hotline to inform it immediately, and that Pakistan did not respond only because of restraint.
  • Lesson: CBMs cover ballistic missile tests but not cruise missiles or accidents of this kind. Better communication rules are needed.

Strengths and weaknesses of existing CBMs

Strengths

  • Some measures (nuclear lists, missile test notification, DGMO hotline) have survived serious crises.
  • They show that both sides accept the basic logic of risk reduction.
  • The DGMO channel helped end the 2025 crisis.

Weaknesses

  • Narrow scope: they do not cover cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic weapons, cyber attacks, space or AI.
  • Not institutionalised: there is no permanent body, like the US–Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs), to run them.
  • Hostage to politics: when political relations break down, CBM dialogue also stops. The foreign secretaries’ hotline was agreed but was not put to real use.
  • No verification and no mechanism to deal with violations.
  • Analysts on both sides now agree that the existing CBMs are inadequate for fast escalation, as seen in 2025.

Arms Control Proposals and Why They Have Failed

Pakistan’s proposals

Pakistan has made many regional proposals, often linked to India’s policy:

  • South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SANWFZ): proposed at the UN General Assembly from 1974 (after India’s test).
  • 1978–79: joint renunciation of nuclear weapons; simultaneous accession to the NPT; mutual inspection of facilities; simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards.
  • 1987: bilateral nuclear test ban.
  • 1991: a five-nation conference (US, USSR, China, India, Pakistan) on non-proliferation in South Asia.
  • Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), 1998: proposed after the tests. It had three interlinked elements:
    1. Conflict resolution, especially Kashmir;
    2. Conventional balance, to limit the arms gap;
    3. Nuclear and missile restraint: no deployment, non-induction of ABM systems, test moratorium, risk reduction.
  • Pakistan’s leaders continue to call for reciprocal risk-reduction measures and a wider strategic balance in South Asia.

India’s proposals and approach

  • India prefers global measures. It has sponsored UN resolutions on a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (since 1982) and Reducing Nuclear Danger (since 1998).
  • India has proposed a global No First Use agreement and a bilateral NFU and non-use against non-nuclear states. It has offered Pakistan an NFU arrangement, which Pakistan rejects (since NFU would weaken its deterrence against India’s conventional superiority).
  • India’s 2006 Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament at the CD set out steps towards global elimination.
  • India rejects the SRR, because:
    • it treats India and Pakistan as equals (“hyphenation”);
    • it ignores China, which is India’s main strategic concern;
    • it links nuclear restraint to Kashmir, which India sees as a bilateral political issue under the Simla Agreement;
    • it would limit India’s conventional forces, which also face China.

Why arms control has failed in South Asia

  1. Asymmetric threat perceptions: India looks at China and Pakistan; Pakistan looks only at India. A bilateral treaty cannot satisfy both.
  2. The strategic chain (China → India → Pakistan): India will not limit its forces unless China is included; China refuses to join arms control with India.
  3. Conventional imbalance: Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons to offset India’s conventional strength, so it will not accept NFU or limits on tactical weapons.
  4. Unresolved disputes and terrorism: Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and now water (Indus Waters Treaty) poison the political climate.
  5. Lack of trust and verification: there is no habit of inspections or data exchanges on forces.
  6. Domestic politics and nationalism: leaders gain little politically from arms control and risk criticism for “weakness”.
  7. Status concerns: India wants recognition as a major power, not equality with Pakistan.
  8. Weak global regime: the collapse of US–Russia arms control and great-power rivalry give South Asian states little incentive to restrain themselves.
  9. No dialogue: the Composite Dialogue ended after 2008; after 2019 and especially after 2025, high-level engagement has been frozen.

Unilateral restraint

Even without treaties, both states have shown some unilateral restraint:

  • Testing moratorium since 1998.
  • India’s NFU and civilian control; its policy of credible minimum deterrence.
  • Both keep most warheads de-mated (stored separately from delivery systems) in peacetime, according to most analysts, although sea-based forces are changing this for India.
  • Both have strengthened export controls (India’s WMD Act, 2005; Pakistan’s Export Control Act, 2004).

Nuclear Security and Safety

Arms control is about the danger of war between states. Nuclear security is about preventing theft, sabotage or illegal transfer of nuclear material, and nuclear safety is about preventing accidents.

The A. Q. Khan network

  • Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist who had worked at URENCO in the Netherlands, led Pakistan’s uranium enrichment programme at Kahuta.
  • From the late 1980s to 2003, his network supplied centrifuge technology and designs to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
  • The network was exposed in 2003–04, after Libya gave up its programme. In February 2004 Khan made a televised confession; he was pardoned by President Musharraf and kept under restrictions. He died in 2021.
  • Consequences: severe damage to Pakistan’s non-proliferation credibility; it remains a key reason why Pakistan has not received an NSG waiver like India.

Pakistan’s nuclear security system

  • National Command Authority (NCA), set up in 2000, with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as its secretariat.
  • SPD has a large security division for physical protection, personnel reliability programmes and counter-intelligence.
  • Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) (2001) for safety.
  • Pakistan points to these measures and its participation in international security frameworks to argue that its arsenal is safe. Western concerns have focused on militancy, insider threats and political instability.

India’s nuclear security system

  • Nuclear Command Authority (2003) and Strategic Forces Command.
  • Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) for safety; a planned independent nuclear safety regulator has been discussed for many years.
  • The WMD and their Delivery Systems Act (2005) criminalises illegal transfers.
  • India set up the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) and took part in the Nuclear Security Summits (2010–2016).

International frameworks

  • Both are parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 amendment.
  • Both support UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on preventing non-state actors from acquiring WMD.
  • India has also joined the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Remaining risks

  • Terrorism and insider threats, given the active militant groups in the region.
  • Tactical nuclear weapons, which require dispersal and may weaken central control in wartime.
  • Expanding civil nuclear programmes and more fissile material.
  • Cyber attacks on nuclear command, control and early warning systems.

Way Forward

Scholars and practitioners from both countries have suggested practical steps that do not require a full political settlement.

Strengthening crisis communication

  • Upgrade the DGMO hotline and make the foreign secretaries’ and NSAs’ channels actually work.
  • Create Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs) in both capitals, staffed around the clock, on the US–Soviet model (1987).
  • Agree on rules for accidental launches (learning from the 2022 BrahMos incident).

Expanding existing agreements

  • Extend the missile test notification agreement to cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons and space launches.
  • Extend the Non-Attack Agreement to cover nuclear command and control facilities and possibly population centres.
  • Make the 2007 accidents agreement permanent and add procedures for joint investigation.

New domains

  • Understandings on cyber attacks against nuclear command and control and early warning systems.
  • Norms on AI in military decision-making, keeping humans in control of nuclear decisions.
  • Maritime CBMs, such as an Incidents at Sea Agreement, as both deploy nuclear-capable naval forces.
  • Rules for drones and space assets.

Unilateral and declaratory steps

  • Keep the testing moratorium and de-mated posture in peacetime.
  • Clear public communication of doctrine to reduce misperception.
  • Avoid co-locating conventional and nuclear forces, to reduce entanglement.

Multilateral and Track-II efforts

  • Revive Track-II dialogues (such as the Ottawa dialogue and Chaophraya dialogue) on nuclear risk.
  • Encourage China–India strategic talks on nuclear issues; a trilateral or wider dialogue may be needed in the long run.
  • India’s support for FMCT negotiations and Pakistan’s concerns about existing stocks could be addressed through creative formulas at the CD.

Conclusion

South Asia has plenty of deterrence but very little arms control. India and Pakistan are outside the NPT and the CTBT, the FMCT is blocked, and there is no bilateral treaty limiting their arsenals. India has been partly integrated into the global nuclear order through the 2008 civil nuclear deal and membership of the MTCR, Wassenaar and the Australia Group, while Pakistan remains outside, partly because of the legacy of the A. Q. Khan network.

The main reasons for failure are structural: the China–India–Pakistan strategic chain, India’s global framing versus Pakistan’s regional framing, conventional asymmetry, unresolved disputes and terrorism, and a weakening global arms control regime.

Yet a few modest CBMs – especially the Non-Attack Agreement, missile test notification and the DGMO hotline – have survived even the worst crises, including 2025. This shows that both sides value basic risk reduction. The realistic goal for the near future is therefore not disarmament or a grand treaty, but stronger, institutionalised and updated risk-reduction measures that match the speed and technology of modern crises.

For exam answers, students should present both perspectives fairly: India’s emphasis on global, non-discriminatory disarmament and its concerns about China; and Pakistan’s emphasis on regional balance and strategic restraint.

Quick Revision

ItemKey fact
NPTSigned 1968, in force 1970, extended 1995; India and Pakistan not members
CTBT1996; India blocked at CD; both observe test moratorium since 1998
FMCTShannon Mandate (CD/1299), 1995; Pakistan blocks over existing stocks
UNSC Resolution 1172June 1998, condemned the tests
Indo-US nuclear dealJoint Statement July 2005; Hyde Act 2006; 123 Agreement 2008
NSG waiver for India6 September 2008
India’s regime membershipsMTCR 2016, Wassenaar 2017, Australia Group 2018
Non-Attack AgreementSigned 31 Dec 1988; lists exchanged every 1 January
Lahore DeclarationFebruary 1999 (Vajpayee–Sharif)
Missile test pre-notification2005 (ballistic missiles only)
Nuclear accidents agreement2007
Strategic Restraint RegimePakistan’s proposal, 1998
SANWFZPakistan’s proposal from 1974
Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan1988, for a nuclear-weapon-free world
A. Q. Khan confessionFebruary 2004
BrahMos accidental launch9 March 2022, Mian Channu

One-line memory aids

  • Disarmament = abolish; non-proliferation = stop spread; arms control = manage; CBMs = build trust.
  • India = global, non-discriminatory, include China. Pakistan = regional, balance with India.

Exam Practice

Long-answer questions

  1. Distinguish between disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Examine their relevance to South Asia.
  2. Discuss India’s position on the NPT and CTBT. Has the Indo-US nuclear deal changed India’s place in the global nuclear order?
  3. Examine the confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan in the nuclear field. Are they adequate?
  4. Why has arms control failed in South Asia? Suggest measures for nuclear risk reduction.
  5. Critically examine Pakistan’s proposal for a Strategic Restraint Regime and India’s response.
  6. Discuss the issue of NSG membership for India and Pakistan.
  7. Examine the challenges of nuclear security in South Asia with reference to the A. Q. Khan network.

Short-answer questions

  1. Arms control (Schelling and Halperin)
  2. Nuclear apartheid
  3. Shannon Mandate
  4. NSG waiver of 2008
  5. Non-Attack Agreement (1988)
  6. Lahore MoU
  7. Strategic Restraint Regime
  8. SANWFZ
  9. A. Q. Khan network
  10. BrahMos accidental launch (2022)

MCQs (UGC-NET / OPSC style)

  1. Under the NPT, a nuclear weapon state is one that tested a nuclear device before:
    • (a) 1 January 1965 (b) 1 January 1967 (c) 1 July 1968 (d) 5 March 1970
    • Answer: (b)
  2. The NSG granted India a waiver for civil nuclear trade in:
    • (a) 2005 (b) 2006 (c) 2008 (d) 2016
    • Answer: (c)
  3. Which of the following export control regimes has India NOT joined?
    • (a) MTCR (b) Wassenaar Arrangement (c) Australia Group (d) NSG
    • Answer: (d)
  4. India and Pakistan exchange lists of nuclear installations under the agreement signed in:
    • (a) 1972 (b) 1988 (c) 1999 (d) 2005
    • Answer: (b)
  5. The negotiating mandate for the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament is known as the:
    • (a) Shannon Mandate (b) Lahore Mandate (c) Hyde Mandate (d) Geneva Mandate
    • Answer: (a)
  6. The proposal for a “Strategic Restraint Regime” in South Asia was made by:
    • (a) India (b) Pakistan (c) China (d) United States
    • Answer: (b)
  7. Match the following:
    • A. Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan – 1. 2005
    • B. Lahore Declaration – 2. 1988
    • C. Missile test pre-notification agreement – 3. 2007
    • D. Nuclear accidents agreement – 4. 1999
    • Answer: A-2, B-4, C-1, D-3
  8. Assertion (A): India refused to sign the NPT. Reason (R): India considered the NPT discriminatory because it divided the world into nuclear haves and have-nots.
    • Answer: Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.
  9. The UN Security Council resolution that condemned the 1998 nuclear tests was:
    • (a) 1540 (b) 1172 (c) 242 (d) 687
    • Answer: (b)
  10. Arms control was classically defined by:
    • (a) Waltz and Sagan (b) Schelling and Halperin (c) Brodie and Kahn (d) Snyder and Jervis
    • Answer: (b)

Suggested readings

  • Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control.
  • Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid”, Foreign Affairs (1998).
  • Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb.
  • Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass.
  • Michael Krepon et al. (eds.), works on nuclear risk reduction in South Asia (Stimson Center).
  • Rakesh Sood (ed.), Nuclear Order in the Twenty-First Century.
  • Rajesh Rajagopalan, works on India and the nuclear order.

Sources for recent developments

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