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International Relations of South Asia

What Structural Realism Explains in South Asia

By Brajabandhu Mahanta•November 17, 2026•15 min read

Before discussing the limits of structural realism, a balanced answer must first show what it explains well. South Asia has many features that look like a textbook realist world: two enduring rivalries, repeated wars, arms races, nuclear weapons, alliances with outside powers and a weak regional institution. Many scholars and policymakers in the region think in realist terms. This topic examines how far realist concepts help us understand South Asian security.

How to apply the theory

Structural realism predicts that, in an anarchic system, states will:

  1. Rely on self-help and build military power.
  2. Balance against stronger or threatening states, internally (arming) and externally (alliances).
  3. Get trapped in security dilemmas and arms races.
  4. Care about relative gains, which makes cooperation difficult.
  5. Be shaped by the distribution of power (polarity) in the wider system.
  6. Be deterred from major war by nuclear weapons (Waltz’s view).
  7. If powerful, seek regional dominance (Mearsheimer’s offensive realism).

The rest of these notes test each prediction against South Asian evidence.

Why realism appeals in South Asia

Anarchy, Self-help and Militarisation

Absence of a regional authority

Self-help behaviour

Assessment

The absence of effective regional institutions and the high level of military preparation strongly support the realist picture of anarchy and self-help.

Balance of Power: Internal and External Balancing

Balance of power is the core prediction of structural realism, and South Asia offers many examples.

Pakistan’s balancing against India

Pakistan, much smaller than India, has consistently tried to balance Indian power.

India’s balancing

Summary table

ActorMain threat perceivedInternal balancingExternal balancing
PakistanIndiaArmy build-up; nuclear weapons; tactical nuclear weaponsUSA (Cold War, post-9/11); China; Saudi Arabia
IndiaChina and the China–Pakistan axisNuclear weapons; missiles; military modernisation; border infrastructureUSSR (1971); USA, Japan, Australia (Quad); France
China (as a regional actor)India’s rise; US influenceMilitary modernisationPakistan as a counterweight to India

Assessment

The repeated pattern of Pakistan aligning with outside powers against India, and India aligning against China, strongly supports Waltz’s prediction that balances of power recur in an anarchic system.

Balance of Threat: How Smaller States Respond

Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory explains the behaviour of India’s smaller neighbours better than a simple balance of power. For them, India is threatening because of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and, at times, perceived intentions (interventions in Sri Lanka 1987, Maldives 1988, the Nepal blockades of 1989 and 2015).

Three strategies

StrategyMeaningSouth Asian examples
BalancingAligning with others against the threatening powerPakistan with China and the USA; Nepal and Sri Lanka at times leaning towards China
BandwagoningAligning with the stronger, nearby powerBhutan’s close alignment with India (1949 Treaty; revised 2007); Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024)
HedgingKeeping ties with several powers to avoid full dependence on oneSri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh balancing India and China; India itself between the USA, Russia and China

Country examples

Assessment

Walt’s theory explains why small neighbours fear the nearer power (India) more than the distant one (China) and why they hedge. It also explains why Bhutan, facing China directly, bandwagons with India. This is one of the strongest applications of realist ideas to South Asia.

Security Dilemma and Arms Races

The security dilemma (Herz, Jervis) is clearly visible in South Asia: measures one state takes for its own security make its rival feel less secure, leading to a cycle of reaction.

The strategic chain: China → India → Pakistan

South Asia’s arms competition is not just bilateral; it is a chain or “security trilemma”:

  1. China’s nuclear test (1964), coming soon after the 1962 war, pushed India to develop a nuclear option.
  2. India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” (Pokhran-I, 1974) pushed Pakistan to accelerate its own programme (A.Q. Khan, Kahuta).
  3. India’s 1998 tests (Pokhran-II, justified mainly by the China threat in Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton) were followed within weeks by Pakistan’s tests at Chagai.
  4. India builds capabilities against China (long-range Agni missiles, naval forces); Pakistan sees these as threats to itself and responds; China supports Pakistan to keep India occupied.

Examples of action and reaction

AreaIndia’s movePakistan’s or China’s response
Nuclear tests1974 and 1998 testsPakistan’s 1998 tests
MissilesPrithvi and Agni series; missile defenceGhauri, Shaheen and Babur missiles; MIRV development
Doctrine“Cold Start” (proactive limited offensive, from around 2004)Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons (Nasr) and “full spectrum deterrence”
BorderInfrastructure on the LAC after Doklam and GalwanChina’s “xiaokang” border villages and roads
MaritimeNaval expansion; Andaman and Nicobar CommandChina’s ports and naval deployments; Pakistan’s naval nuclear capability
AlliancesQuad, defence agreements with the USADeeper China–Pakistan military cooperation

Why the dilemma is sharp in South Asia

Assessment

The arms race and the action–reaction chain among China, India and Pakistan are among the clearest confirmations of realist theory in the region.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Absence of Major War

Kenneth Waltz argued that nuclear weapons make major war irrational and therefore promote stability. South Asia provides important evidence for this argument (details of deterrence theory are studied in Unit III).

Evidence supporting the realist view

India–China

Assessment

The absence of full-scale war since 1971, and the limited nature of crises since 1998, support the realist deterrence argument. However, the frequency of crises and the risk of escalation (the stability-instability paradox) are important counter-arguments, examined in the next topic and in Unit III.

Polarity, Great Powers and Regional Hegemony

Polarity shapes regional alignments

Structural realism holds that the distribution of power in the global system shapes the behaviour of regional states. South Asian alignments have closely followed changes in global polarity.

Global structurePeriodEffect on South Asia
Bipolarity (USA vs USSR)1947–1991Pakistan aligned with the USA; India moved towards the USSR; South Asian rivalry became part of the Cold War
Unipolarity (US dominance)1991–around 2008India liberalised and moved closer to the USA; the USA mediated in crises (Kargil 1999) and led the war in Afghanistan
Emerging bipolarity or multipolarity (USA vs China, with Russia, India and others)2008 onwardIndia aligns with the USA, Japan and Australia against China (Quad); Pakistan deepens ties with China; smaller states hedge between India and China

Great-power penetration

India’s search for regional primacy (offensive realism)

China and power transition

Relative Gains and the Limits of Cooperation

Structural realists (Waltz, Grieco) argue that states care about relative gains (who gains more) and fear dependence, so cooperation is difficult even when all would benefit. South Asia’s very weak regional cooperation fits this view.

Evidence

Assessment

The persistent failure of regional cooperation, despite large potential gains from trade, energy and water sharing, is well explained by the realist logic of relative gains, mistrust and fear of dependence.

Overall Assessment

Realist conceptEvidence from South AsiaHow well it explains
Anarchy and self-helpNo effective regional authority; high defence spending; nuclear weaponsStrong
Balance of powerPakistan’s alliances with the USA, China and Saudi Arabia; India’s ties with the USSR, then the USA and the QuadStrong
Balance of threatSmaller states fear nearby India; hedging with China; Bhutan bandwagonsStrong
Security dilemma and arms raceChina–India–Pakistan nuclear and missile chain; Cold Start vs tactical nuclear weaponsStrong
Nuclear deterrenceNo full-scale war since 1971; limited crises since 1998Partial: no major war, but frequent crises
PolarityAlignments changed with the Cold War, unipolarity and US–China rivalryStrong
Regional hegemonyIndira Doctrine; interventions; concern about ChinaPartial: India’s primacy is incomplete and contested
Relative gainsFailure of SAARC and SAFTA; trade restrictions; IWT in abeyanceStrong

Conclusion

Structural realism explains a great deal about South Asian security, especially at the level of relations between states. The recurring balancing by Pakistan and India, the arms race and security dilemma among China, India and Pakistan, the influence of global polarity on regional alignments, the hedging of smaller states, the failure of regional cooperation and the absence of full-scale war under nuclear deterrence all fit realist predictions.

However, realism explains patterns of behaviour better than their causes and content. It does not explain why the India–Pakistan rivalry is so deeply tied to identity and ideology, why the most frequent violence comes from non-state actors and internal insurgencies, why domestic politics (such as the Pakistani army’s role) shapes security policy, or why non-traditional threats (migration, water, climate) matter so much. These gaps are the subject of the next topic: the limits of structural realism in South Asia.

Quick Revision

ItemKey fact
Pakistan’s US alliancesMutual Defence Assistance Agreement and SEATO (1954); CENTO (1955); major non-NATO ally (2004)
China–Pakistan border agreement1963
Indo-Soviet TreatyAugust 1971
China’s first nuclear test1964
India’s nuclear tests1974 (Pokhran-I); 1998 (Pokhran-II)
Pakistan’s nuclear testsMay 1998 (Chagai)
Cold Start doctrineAround 2004
Nasr tactical nuclear missileFirst tested 2011
Agreement on non-attack of nuclear installations1988
India withdraws MFN for Pakistan2019
Fearful SymmetrySumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty (2005)
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A DebateScott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz (1995)

One-line memory aids

Exam Practice

Long-answer questions

  1. How far does structural realism explain the security behaviour of South Asian states?
  2. Discuss the India–Pakistan rivalry in the light of balance of power theory.
  3. Explain the “security dilemma” and the China–India–Pakistan strategic chain.
  4. Has nuclear deterrence brought stability to South Asia? Discuss from a realist perspective.
  5. Apply Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory to the foreign policies of India’s smaller neighbours.
  6. How have changes in global polarity affected alignments in South Asia?
  7. Is India a regional hegemon? Examine in the light of offensive realism.

Short-answer questions

  1. External balancing
  2. Bandwagoning
  3. Hedging
  4. Security trilemma
  5. Cold Start doctrine
  6. Full spectrum deterrence
  7. Indira Doctrine
  8. Penetrated regional system
  9. Relative gains
  10. Fearful Symmetry

MCQs (UGC-NET / OPSC style)

  1. Pakistan joined SEATO in:
    • (a) 1950 (b) 1954 (c) 1962 (d) 1971
    • Answer: (b)
  2. Which South Asian country is the clearest example of bandwagoning with India?
    • (a) Nepal (b) Sri Lanka (c) Bhutan (d) Maldives
    • Answer: (c)
  3. Fearful Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons was written by:
    • (a) Sagan and Waltz (b) Ganguly and Hagerty (c) Cohen and Dasgupta (d) Paul and Kapur
    • Answer: (b)
  4. Pakistan’s Nasr missile is associated with:
    • (a) Strategic deterrence against China (b) Tactical nuclear response to Cold Start (c) Missile defence (d) Space programme
    • Answer: (b)
  5. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in:
    • (a) 1962 (b) 1965 (c) 1971 (d) 1974
    • Answer: (c)
  6. India’s “Monroe Doctrine” for South Asia usually refers to:
    • (a) Gujral Doctrine (b) Indira Doctrine (c) Panchsheel (d) Look East Policy
    • Answer: (b)
  7. Match the following:
    • A. Pokhran-I – 1. 1998
    • B. Chagai tests – 2. 1974
    • C. China’s first nuclear test – 3. 1964
    • D. Non-attack of nuclear installations agreement – 4. 1988
    • Answer: A-2, B-1, C-3, D-4
  8. Assertion (A): Regional cooperation through SAARC has been weak. Reason (R): India and Pakistan are concerned about relative gains and mutual security.
    • Answer: Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.
  9. Which theory best explains why India’s smaller neighbours fear India more than distant China?
    • (a) Balance of power (b) Balance of threat (c) Democratic peace (d) Complex interdependence
    • Answer: (b)
  10. Which of the following is an example of internal balancing?
    • (a) Joining the Quad (b) Signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty (c) Developing the Agni missile series (d) Joining CENTO
    • Answer: (c)

Suggested readings

Category: International Relations of South Asia
Tag: Structural Realism
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