INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA

# Limits of Structural Realism in South Asia

By **Brajabandhu Mahanta** • November 17, 2026 • 19 min read




Structural realism explains some **patterns** of South Asian security well, such as balancing, arms races and the failure of regional cooperation (see the previous topic). But it struggles to explain the **sources, nature and content** of most security threats in the region. This topic sets out its main limits, which together form the heart of Unit II.

## The core argument in one paragraph

Structural realism was built to explain the behaviour of **great powers** in a system of **strong, cohesive, sovereign states** whose main threats come from **other states**. South Asian states are mostly **post-colonial, internally divided and weakly consolidated**. Their most frequent and deadly threats come from **within** (insurgencies, ethnic and religious conflict, regime crises) or from **non-state and non-military** sources (terrorism, migration, water, climate). Their foreign policies are shaped by **identity, history and domestic politics**, not only by the distribution of power. Therefore, the realist model of unitary states balancing each other in anarchy gives an **incomplete and sometimes misleading** picture of South Asian security.

## Realist assumptions to be tested

| Realist assumption | Question for South Asia |
|---|---|
| The main threats are external and military | Are most threats actually internal or non-military? |
| States are unitary, rational actors | Do armies, parties, provinces and leaders pursue their own interests? |
| State interests come from structure, not identity | Are rivalries driven by religion, nationhood and history? |
| States are the main actors | What about terrorist groups, insurgents and diasporas? |
| States are “like units” with full sovereignty | Are South Asian states weak, with porous borders and contested legitimacy? |
| Cooperation is rare and fragile | Why have some treaties and friendships lasted? |
| The theory is universal | Was it built mainly on European and Cold War experience? |

Each of these is discussed below.

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## Limit 1: Internal Threats and Regime Security

### The problem

Structural realism assumes that security threats come mainly from **other states** across the border. In South Asia, the most frequent, long-lasting and deadly threats have been **internal**.

- **Insurgencies and separatism**: Kashmir and the north-east (India), Balochistan and the tribal areas (Pakistan), the Tamil north and east (Sri Lanka, 1983–2009), the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh, till 1997), the Maoist People's War (Nepal, 1996–2006).
- **Breakup of a state from within**: Pakistan lost half its territory and population in 1971 not because of a structural shift in the balance of power, but because of an **internal crisis of identity and legitimacy** (Bengali nationalism), which India then exploited.
- **Regime crises and uprisings**: Sri Lanka's Aragalaya (2022), Bangladesh's 2024 uprising, Nepal's 2025 Gen Z protests, and repeated coups and political crises in Pakistan show that **governments often fall due to internal pressure**, not foreign attack.
- Over the decades, internal conflicts in South Asia have killed far more people than the inter-state wars since 1971.

### Concepts that explain this better

- **Mohammed Ayoob's "subaltern realism"** (*The Third World Security Predicament*, 1995): Third World states are **"late state-makers"**. Because they are still building their states, their main security problem is **internal**: establishing control, legitimacy and national integration. External threats often matter mainly because they **exploit internal weaknesses**.
- **Barry Buzan's "weak states"** (*People, States and Fear*): states with weak **socio-political cohesion** feel threatened mainly by internal forces; in such states, **national security often means regime security**.

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- **Brian Job's "insecurity dilemma"** (*The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, 1992): in weak states, the regime, rival groups and society all feel insecure from each other. Unlike the classical security dilemma between states, the main dilemma lies **inside** the state.
- **K.J. Holsti** (*The State, War, and the State of War*, 1996): since 1945, most wars have been **wars within states**, not between them.

### Examples of regime security driving "national" security

- Pakistani governments and the army often present domestic opposition (Bengali, Baloch, Pashtun movements) as **foreign-backed threats** to national security.
- Sri Lankan governments treated Tamil demands for autonomy as threats to the unitary state.
- Bangladesh's Awami League government (2009–2024) used security laws against political opponents.

### Why this matters

If the main threats are internal, then **balance of power and military alliances** cannot solve them. They require **state-building, inclusive governance, federalism, development and political accommodation**, which are outside structural realism's scope.

## Limit 2: The State Is Not a Unitary Actor

### The problem

Waltz treats states as **unitary "like units"** and says his theory does not explain foreign policy. But in South Asia, security policy is often driven by **domestic institutions, leaders, parties, provinces and public opinion**, which can push states in directions that structure alone would not predict.

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## Civil-military relations in Pakistan

- The **army** controls India, Afghanistan and nuclear policy, even under civilian governments. Its institutional interests (budget, prestige, economic empire, “Military Inc.” in Ayesha Siddiqa’s term) and identity are tied to the India threat.
- **Kargil (1999)**: the operation was planned by the army under General Pervez Musharraf, apparently without the full knowledge or approval of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, just months after the **Lahore Declaration** (February 1999). This shows how **internal divisions**, not systemic logic, produced a war.
- Civilian attempts at peace with India (Nawaz Sharif in 1999 and 2014–15; the 2004–07 “composite dialogue”) were often undermined by the army or militant attacks.

## Domestic politics in India

- **Coalition and regional parties** shape foreign policy: Tamil Nadu parties influenced India’s Sri Lanka policy (the IPKF, votes on UN resolutions); West Bengal’s opposition blocked the **Teesta water-sharing agreement** with Bangladesh in 2011.
- **Public opinion and elections**: responses to terror attacks (surgical strikes 2016, Balakot 2019, Operation Sindoor 2025) are shaped by domestic political pressure and nationalism, not only by strategic calculation.
- **Leadership**: Nehru’s non-alignment, Indira Gandhi’s assertiveness, Gujral’s generosity, Vajpayee’s Lahore bus journey (1999) and Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” show how much individual leaders matter.

## Other examples

- **Sri Lanka**: Sinhala nationalist parties and the Buddhist clergy prevented compromises with Tamils that might have ended the conflict early.
- **Nepal and Maldives**: foreign policy swings (pro-India or pro-China) often follow **changes of government**, not changes in the balance of power.

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- **Bangladesh**: relations with India changed sharply after the fall of Sheikh Hasina (2024), again a domestic, not structural, cause.

### Better explanations

- **Neoclassical realism** (domestic "intervening variables"), **liberal** theories (domestic preferences, regime type), **bureaucratic politics** models (Graham Allison) and **leadership** studies explain these cases better than Waltz's structural model.

## Limit 3: Identity, Ideology and History

### The problem

Structural realism says state interests come from **material structure** (anarchy and the distribution of power), not from identity or ideas. But in South Asia, many conflicts are driven by **who states think they are** and how they see the "other".

### The India–Pakistan rivalry as an identity conflict

- The rivalry began with **competing ideas of nationhood**: India as a secular, civic, plural nation; Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent (the two-nation theory).
- **Kashmir** is not just territory or strategic real estate. For Pakistan, a Muslim-majority Kashmir in India challenges the logic of the two-nation theory; for India, giving up Kashmir on religious grounds would challenge its secular identity. This makes compromise very hard, even when material costs are high.
- **Memory of Partition and 1971**: trauma, humiliation and mutual stereotypes shape perceptions on both sides. Pakistan's identity is partly built in opposition to India.
- **Religious nationalism** on both sides (political Islam in Pakistan; Hindu nationalism in India) intensifies hostility.
- A purely realist view cannot explain why the rivalry has persisted even when **power asymmetry** was overwhelming (after 1971) or when cooperation would clearly bring

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large economic gains.

## Other examples

- **Sri Lanka**: Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, not the balance of power, drove policy towards Tamils and shaped relations with India.
- **Bangladesh**: relations with India and Pakistan depend on how the nation's identity is defined (Bengali/secular vs Bangladeshi/Islamic).
- **India–Bhutan amity**: shared cultural ties and a long history of trust explain a friendship that realism, which expects suspicion of a powerful neighbour, cannot fully explain.
- **India and Nepal**: the "roti-beti" relationship (open borders, intermarriage, shared religion) coexists with Nepali nationalism against Indian dominance.

## Better explanations

- **Constructivism** (Alexander Wendt): **"anarchy is what states make of it"**. India–Pakistan relations reflect a **Hobbesian culture of enmity**, India–Bhutan a more **Kantian culture of friendship**, and India–China a **Lockean culture of rivalry**, all under the same anarchy.
- **Strategic culture** approaches (George Tanham, *Indian Strategic Thought*, 1992; Kanti Bajpai on Indian grand strategy; Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*, 2014): states' historical experiences and beliefs shape how they use force. Fair argues that the Pakistan army is an **ideological** institution that will not accept the status quo even when it loses.
- **Ontological security** (security of identity, not only of territory) helps explain why states pursue costly policies to protect their sense of self.

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# Limit 4: Non-state Actors, Terrorism and the Limits of Deterrence

## The problem

Structural realism is **state-centric**: only states matter as actors. But in South Asia, many of the most serious security events have been caused by **non-state actors**.

- **Terrorist and militant groups**: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Mumbai 2008, Pahalgam 2025, according to India), Jaish-e-Mohammed (Parliament attack 2001, Pulwama 2019), the TTP (attacks inside Pakistan, the 2014 Peshawar school massacre), ISIS-K, and earlier the LTTE (which assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991).
- **Insurgent groups** with cross-border bases (Naga and Manipuri groups in Myanmar; Baloch groups; the TTP in Afghanistan).
- **Crime and smuggling networks**, and **diasporas** that fund or lobby for causes (Tamil, Sikh, Kashmiri, Baloch).

## Why non-state actors challenge realism

- They have **no territory or population to hold hostage**, so classical deterrence does not work directly on them.
- **State sponsorship and deniability**: when states support militant groups as proxies, it becomes unclear who is responsible. Realism has no clear framework for this “grey zone”.
- They can **trigger inter-state crises**: Kargil involved irregulars; the 2001–02 standoff, the 2016 and 2019 strikes and the 2025 conflict were all triggered by terrorist attacks. The decision to escalate was effectively influenced by non-state actors.
- They often **turn against their sponsors**: Pakistan has suffered heavily from the TTP, a product of the same jihadi networks it once used.

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### The stability-instability paradox

- **Glenn Snyder (1965)**: when nuclear weapons make full-scale war too dangerous (strategic **stability**), states may feel freer to engage in lower-level conflict (**instability**).
- **S. Paul Kapur** (*Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia*, 2007) argued that nuclear weapons **increased** instability in South Asia: Pakistan felt protected by its nuclear shield to support militancy and limited operations (Kargil), which in turn provoked Indian responses.
- The sequence of crises (1999, 2001–02, 2008, 2016, 2019, 2025) suggests that nuclear deterrence has prevented full-scale war but **not** prevented recurring violence. The 2025 conflict even involved missile and drone strikes between two nuclear powers.
- This challenges Waltz's optimism that "more may be better" and supports **Scott Sagan's** argument that organisational problems, civil-military issues and militant groups make proliferation dangerous.

### Better explanations

- Studies of **terrorism, insurgency and proxy war**; **critical terrorism studies**; Sagan's **organisational theory**; and **Unit III**'s analysis of deterrence in South Asia.

## Limit 5: Non-traditional and Human Security

### The problem

Structural realism defines security narrowly as **military protection of the state**. In South Asia, the threats that affect the most people are often **non-military and transnational**, and the **referent object** of security is frequently the **individual or community**, not the state.

### Major non-traditional threats

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| Threat | South Asian examples | Why realism misses it |
|---|---|---|
| Poverty and hunger | Large shares of the world's poor and malnourished live in the region | Not a military threat; needs development |
| Climate change and disasters | Floods in Pakistan (2022); cyclones in Bangladesh and Odisha; sea-level rise in Maldives; glacial melt in the Himalayas | Transnational; no enemy state to balance |
| Water scarcity and river disputes | Indus, Ganga, Teesta, Brahmaputra | Requires cooperation, not deterrence |
| Migration and refugees | Partition, 1971, Tibetans, Tamils, Lhotshampas, Afghans, Rohingya | Driven by internal conflict and poverty |
| Pandemics | COVID-19 | No military solution |
| Drugs, trafficking and organised crime | Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle routes | Non-state, cross-border networks |
| Economic crises | Sri Lanka's default (2022); Pakistan's repeated IMF bailouts | Internal economic management |

## Human security

- The concept of **human security** was popularised by the **UNDP Human Development Report (1994)**, strongly shaped by the Pakistani economist **Mahbub ul Haq** (with Amartya Sen's ideas on capability and development).
- It shifts the focus from the security of the state to **"freedom from fear" and "freedom from want"** for people.
- In South Asia, states have spent heavily on defence while large parts of their populations lacked basic security of food, health and livelihood; Mahbub ul Haq famously criticised this **"guns versus butter"** trade-off.

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### Better explanations

- **Broadened security studies** (Buzan's five sectors), **human security**, the **Copenhagen School** (securitisation: how issues like migration become "security" issues through political speech), and **environmental security** studies.

## Limit 6: Post-colonial States and Contested Sovereignty

### The problem

Waltz assumes that states are **"like units"** with full **Westphalian sovereignty**: clear borders, control over their territory and the same basic functions. South Asian states do not fit this assumption well.

### How South Asian states differ

- **Colonial borders**: lines such as the Durand, McMahon and Radcliffe Lines were drawn by outsiders and remain disputed. Afghanistan has never accepted the Durand Line; China rejects the McMahon Line; Kashmir remains divided.
- **Porous borders**: people, goods, weapons and militants move easily across borders in Punjab, Bengal, the Terai and the Pashtun belt. The India–Nepal border is open by treaty.
- **Cross-border ethnic communities**: Pashtuns, Baloch, Punjabis, Bengalis, Tamils, Madhesis and Nagas live on both sides of borders. Domestic ethnic policies therefore immediately become inter-state issues (for example, the Tamil issue between India and Sri Lanka, the Madhesi issue between India and Nepal).
- **Uneven state presence**: in areas such as Pakistan's former tribal areas, parts of north-east India or much of Afghanistan, the state's control has been limited.
- **Unequal sovereignty in practice**: Bhutan accepted Indian "guidance" in foreign affairs until 2007; Nepal's 1950 treaty and economic dependence limit its freedom; small states are heavily shaped by bigger neighbours.
- **Stephen Krasner** (*Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, 1999) showed that sovereignty is often violated in practice, which is especially visible in South Asia (interventions in 1971,

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1987, 1988; proxy wars).

### Why this matters

- If borders are porous and identities cross them, the clear line between **“internal”** and **“external”** security that realism assumes does not exist.
- Weak states are less able to **mobilise power** for balancing and more vulnerable to outside interference.
- Security problems such as migration, smuggling, militancy and ethnic conflict arise **from the nature of the post-colonial state itself**, a factor outside structural realism.

### Better explanations

- **Post-colonial approaches**, Ayoob’s **subaltern realism**, and Buzan and Wæver’s **Regional Security Complex Theory**, which pays attention to geography, history and cross-border links within a region.

## Limit 7: Cooperation, Amity and Change That Realism Cannot Explain

### The problem

Structural realism expects cooperation to be **rare, fragile and limited by relative-gains concerns**. Yet South Asia also shows durable cooperation, friendships and peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as sharp changes in policy that structure does not predict.

### Durable cooperation

- **Indus Waters Treaty (1960)**: survived the wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999 and many crises for 65 years, until India placed it “in abeyance” in 2025. Its long survival shows that **institutions and shared interests** can moderate rivalry, as neoliberal institutionalists argue.

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- **India–Bangladesh**: the **Ganga Water Treaty (1996)**, the **Land Boundary Agreement (2015)**, which settled the enclave issue peacefully, and the **maritime boundary settlements** (with Myanmar in 2012 and India in 2014, through international arbitration, which Bangladesh won substantially and India accepted).
- **India–Pakistan nuclear CBMs**: the annual exchange of lists of nuclear installations since 1992, continuing even in crisis years.
- **India–Nepal open border** and **India–Bhutan hydropower cooperation**.
- **Disaster cooperation**: India's assistance to Sri Lanka and Maldives in the 2004 tsunami; regional COVID-19 cooperation; India's emergency aid to Sri Lanka in 2022.

## Amity and the "security community" idea

- **India–Bhutan** relations resemble a **security community** (Karl Deutsch): a relationship in which war has become unthinkable. Realism, which expects a small state to fear a large neighbour, cannot explain this; **constructivism** (shared identity and trust) can.

## Change not explained by structure

- **India's non-alignment** (1950s): a choice based on ideas and leadership, not on balancing.
- **The Gujral Doctrine** (1996–97): India's non-reciprocal generosity towards smaller neighbours contradicts relative-gains logic.
- **Peace processes**: the Lahore Declaration (1999) and the 2004–07 composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, which came close to solutions on Kashmir (the "four-point formula" discussed by Manmohan Singh and Musharraf), followed by reversals; these came from domestic and leadership factors.
- **Rapid foreign policy swings** in Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka after changes of government.

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### Better explanations

- **Neoliberal institutionalism** (Keohane and Nye): institutions and interdependence enable cooperation.
- **Constructivism**: shared identities, norms and trust create friendship.
- **Liberal theories** of domestic politics and leadership explain changes in policy.

## Limit 8: Eurocentric and Great-power Bias

### The problem

Structural realism was developed mainly from the experience of **European great powers** (from the 17th to the 20th century) and the **US–Soviet Cold War**. Waltz himself said his theory is about **great powers**, because they shape the system. This creates several problems when the theory is applied to South Asia.

### Main points of criticism

- **Ignores the colonial experience**: the theory has nothing to say about how colonial rule created South Asian states, borders and conflicts, which is the root of most regional insecurity (Unit I).
- **Ignores small and weak states**: most South Asian states (Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh) are not great powers; their main concerns are survival as **states and societies**, development and autonomy from bigger neighbours.
- **Assumes the Western state as the norm**: a strong, cohesive nation-state with clear borders, which South Asian states are still trying to become.
- **Treats the region as a passive arena**: as if regional states only react to great-power competition. In fact, regional dynamics (India–Pakistan rivalry, internal conflicts) often drive the involvement of outside powers, not the other way round.
- **Universal claims**: realism presents itself as a timeless, universal theory, but its concepts and examples come from a specific Western history.

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### Third World and non-Western critiques

- **Mohammed Ayoob**: “subaltern realism”, focused on the security predicament of late state-makers.
- **Stephanie Neuman (ed.)**, *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (1998): mainstream IR theories do not fit the Third World well.
- **Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds.)**, *Non-Western International Relations Theory* (2010), and Acharya’s idea of **“Global IR”**: IR theory must include non-Western histories and ideas.
- **Navnita Chadha Behera** and other South Asian scholars: call for **“re-imagining IR”** from South Asian experiences.
- **Post-colonial and feminist scholars** (for example, Sankaran Krishna, *Postcolonial Insecurities*, 1999, on India and Sri Lanka): security discourses are tied to national identity, territory and anxieties produced by colonial history.

### Why this matters

A theory built for great-power politics among strong states can capture the **India–Pakistan–China military balance**, but not the **everyday insecurity** of most South Asian states and peoples. This is why many scholars argue for **alternative or complementary approaches**, discussed in the next topic.

## Summary: Realist Assumptions vs South Asian Reality

| Realist assumption | South Asian reality | Better explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Threats are mainly external and military | Most violence is internal: insurgencies, ethnic conflict, regime crises | Subaltern realism (Ayoob); weak states (Buzan); insecurity dilemma (Job) |
| States are unitary rational actors | Army, parties, provinces and leaders shape policy (Kargil, Teesta, Sri Lanka) | Neoclassical realism; liberalism; bureaucratic politics |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Interests come from material structure | Rivalries are rooted in identity, religion and history (Kashmir) | Constructivism; strategic culture; ontological security |
| Only states matter | Terrorist groups, insurgents and diasporas trigger crises | Terrorism and insurgency studies; Sagan's organisational theory |
| Nuclear weapons bring stability | No full war, but repeated crises (stability-instability paradox) | Snyder; Kapur's "dangerous deterrent" |
| Security means military defence of the state | Climate, water, migration, poverty and pandemics threaten people | Human security; Copenhagen School; environmental security |
| States are sovereign "like units" | Colonial borders, porous frontiers, cross-border ethnic groups, weak state control | Post-colonial theory; Regional Security Complex Theory |
| Cooperation is rare and fragile | Indus Waters Treaty lasted 65 years; Land Boundary Agreement; India–Bhutan amity | Neoliberal institutionalism; constructivism (security community) |
| The theory is universal | Built on European and Cold War great-power experience | Global IR; Third World and post-colonial critiques |

## Conclusion

Structural realism is not wrong about South Asia, but it is **incomplete**. It captures the **inter-state military competition** among India, Pakistan and China, but it misses the **internal, identity-based, non-state and non-traditional** dimensions that dominate everyday insecurity in the region. It treats states as cohesive, sovereign actors, when South Asian states are **post-colonial, plural and still building themselves**. It cannot explain why rivalries persist despite their costs, why some partnerships are deeply friendly, or why policies change sharply with governments and leaders.

A realistic understanding of South Asian security therefore needs to **combine** realism's insights about power with approaches that take seriously **the nature of the post-colonial state, identity, domestic politics, non-state actors and human security**. These approaches (subaltern realism, Regional Security Complex Theory, constructivism, securitisation, human security and feminist perspectives) are the subject of the final topic of

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this unit.

## Quick Revision: Thinkers and Concepts

| Concept | Thinker | Key work |
|---|---|---|
| Subaltern realism; late state-makers | Mohammed Ayoob | *The Third World Security Predicament* (1995) |
| Weak states; regime security | Barry Buzan | *People, States and Fear* (1983, 1991) |
| Insecurity dilemma | Brian Job (ed.) | *The Insecurity Dilemma* (1992) |
| Wars within states | K.J. Holsti | *The State, War, and the State of War* (1996) |
| Stability-instability paradox | Glenn Snyder | "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror" (1965) |
| Dangerous deterrent | S. Paul Kapur | *Dangerous Deterrent* (2007) |
| Organisational dangers of proliferation | Scott Sagan | *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (with Waltz, 1995) |
| Pakistan army's ideological way of war | C. Christine Fair | *Fighting to the End* (2014) |
| Military business (Milbus) | Ayesha Siddiqa | *Military Inc.* (2007) |
| Sovereignty as organised hypocrisy | Stephen Krasner | *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (1999) |
| Indian strategic culture | George Tanham | *Indian Strategic Thought* (1992) |
| Human security | Mahbub ul Haq (UNDP) | Human Development Report (1994) |
| Anarchy is what states make of it | Alexander Wendt | Article (1992) |
| Global IR | Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan | *Non-Western International Relations Theory* (2010) |
| Postcolonial insecurities | Sankaran Krishna | *Postcolonial Insecurities* (1999) |

### One-line memory aids

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- **Eight limits**: internal threats; non-unitary state; identity; non-state actors; non-traditional threats; post-colonial sovereignty; cooperation and change; Eurocentric bias.
- **Kargil (1999)** = army acting without full civilian control, just after the Lahore Declaration.
- **Teesta (2011)** = a state government blocking a foreign agreement.
- **India–Bhutan** = security community; **India–Pakistan** = culture of enmity.

## Exam Practice

### Long-answer questions

1. Critically examine the limits of structural realism in explaining South Asian security.
2. “The main security threats to South Asian states are internal rather than external.” Discuss with reference to Ayoob’s subaltern realism.
3. How do identity and ideology challenge the realist explanation of the India–Pakistan rivalry?
4. Discuss the role of non-state actors in South Asian security. Why does this challenge structural realism?
5. Explain the stability-instability paradox with reference to India and Pakistan.
6. “Structural realism is a theory of great powers and cannot explain the security problems of post-colonial states.” Examine.
7. How does the concept of human security broaden our understanding of security in South Asia?

### Short-answer questions

1. Subaltern realism
2. Insecurity dilemma
3. Regime security

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4. Stability-instability paradox
5. Strategic culture
6. Security community
7. Human security
8. Organised hypocrisy
9. Global IR
10. Weak state

## MCQs (UGC-NET / OPSC style)

1. “Subaltern realism” is associated with:
   - (a) Barry Buzan (b) Mohammed Ayoob (c) Amitav Acharya (d) Stephen Walt
   - **Answer: (b)**

2. The concept of the “insecurity dilemma” in Third World states was developed by:
   - (a) Brian Job (b) John Herz (c) Robert Jervis (d) Kenneth Waltz
   - **Answer: (a)**

3. *Dangerous Deterrent* (2007), which argues that nuclear weapons increased instability in South Asia, was written by:
   - (a) Sumit Ganguly (b) S. Paul Kapur (c) Scott Sagan (d) Stephen Cohen
   - **Answer: (b)**

4. The stability-instability paradox was first formulated by:
   - (a) Glenn Snyder (b) Thomas Schelling (c) Bernard Brodie (d) Henry Kissinger
   - **Answer: (a)**

5. Which event is often cited to show that the Pakistani army acted without full civilian approval?
   - (a) Operation Gibraltar (b) Kargil war (c) Operation Searchlight (d) Simla Agreement

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- **Answer: (b)**

6. The concept of human security was popularised by the UNDP report shaped by:
   - (a) Amartya Sen (b) Mahbub ul Haq (c) Jagdish Bhagwati (d) Muhammad Yunus
   - **Answer: (b)**

7. Match the following:
   - A. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* – 1. C. Christine Fair
   - B. *Fighting to the End* – 2. Stephen Krasner
   - C. *Postcolonial Insecurities* – 3. K.J. Holsti
   - D. *The State, War, and the State of War* – 4. Sankaran Krishna
   - **Answer: A-2, B-1, C-4, D-3**

8. Assertion (A): Nuclear deterrence has not prevented repeated crises between India and Pakistan. Reason (R): Nuclear weapons may encourage limited conflict and proxy war under the nuclear umbrella.
   - **Answer: Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.**

9. Which relationship is often described as resembling a “security community”?
   - (a) India–Pakistan (b) India–China (c) India–Bhutan (d) Pakistan–Afghanistan
   - **Answer: (c)**

10. In 2011, the Teesta water-sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh was blocked mainly because of:
    - (a) China’s opposition (b) Opposition from the West Bengal government (c) A UN ruling (d) Pakistan’s objection
    - **Answer: (b)**

## Suggested readings

- Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*.

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- Brian Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*.
- S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*.
- C. Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*.
- Sankaran Krishna, *Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood*.
- Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory*.
- Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*.


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