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International Relations of South Asia

Deterrence Stability in South Asia: Crises and Debates

By Brajabandhu Mahanta•November 17, 2026•23 min read

India and Pakistan became open nuclear powers in May 1998. Since then the central question of South Asian security has been simple to state but hard to answer: has the bomb made the region safer or more dangerous? Nuclear weapons have not stopped India–Pakistan conflict. The two countries have gone through a series of serious crises – Kargil (1999), the Twin Peaks standoff (2001–02), Mumbai (2008), Uri (2016), Pulwama–Balakot (2019) and Operation Sindoor (2025). But none of these crises has turned into a full-scale war, and nuclear weapons have never been used. Scholars read this record in very different ways.

To study this debate, we first need to be clear about what “stability” means in nuclear strategy. Scholars use three related ideas.

Deterrence stability

Deterrence is stable when neither side has a reason to start a major war, because each knows that the other can inflict unacceptable damage in return. The key requirement is a secure second-strike capability – forces that can survive an enemy first strike and still retaliate. When both sides have such forces, the situation is often called mutual vulnerability or mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Crisis stability

Crisis stability is about behaviour during a crisis. A situation is crisis-stable when neither side feels pressure to strike first out of fear that the other is about to strike (the “use them or lose them” problem). Thomas Schelling called this the problem of the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack”. Crisis stability falls when:

Arms race stability

Arms race stability means that neither side feels compelled to build more and better weapons in response to the other. It falls when new technologies (MIRVs, missile defence, hypersonic missiles) appear to give one side a possible first-strike advantage, forcing the other to respond.

Why South Asia is a special case

South Asia differs from the US–Soviet Cold War in important ways, and these differences make stability harder:

The rest of this topic examines the theoretical debate (the stability–instability paradox and the optimist–pessimist debate), the record of crises, the role of outside powers, and the new sources of risk.

The Stability–Instability Paradox

The original idea

The stability–instability paradox was first described by Glenn Snyder (1965), and the idea is also associated with B. H. Liddell Hart and Robert Jervis. Snyder’s argument was:

When two states have mutual nuclear deterrence, a major war becomes less likely (stability at the strategic level), because neither can win it. But for the same reason, each side may feel freer to engage in limited conflict at lower levels (instability at the sub-strategic level), confident that the other will not escalate to nuclear war.

In simple words, the bomb makes big wars unlikely but may make small wars more likely.

Application to South Asia

The paradox fits South Asia closely, and it is one of the most frequently used frameworks in exam answers.

The paradox in a South Asian form

Many scholars therefore describe South Asia as showing a “double” or “two-sided” stability–instability paradox:

LevelWhat happens
Strategic (nuclear)No full-scale war; no nuclear use; both sides avoid crossing the other’s declared red lines
ConventionalLimited strikes and short wars become thinkable (Kargil, Balakot, Sindoor)
Sub-conventionalMilitancy and terror attacks continue to trigger crises

Criticism of the paradox

The stability–instability paradox is a good starting point, but it must be combined with an analysis of crises, which follows.

Major India–Pakistan Crises under the Nuclear Shadow

The best way to judge deterrence stability in South Asia is to look at how actual crises began, escalated and ended. Scholars usually divide them into crises of covert or “opaque” nuclearization (before 1998) and crises of overt nuclearization (after 1998).

Crises of the opaque nuclear period

Brasstacks crisis (1986–87)

Kashmir crisis (1990)

Crises after the 1998 tests

Kargil War (May–July 1999)

Twin Peaks crisis (2001–02)

Mumbai attacks (November 2008)

Uri and the “surgical strikes” (September 2016)

Pulwama–Balakot (February 2019)

Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor (April–May 2025)

Significance of Sindoor for deterrence stability:

Summary table of crises

CrisisTriggerHow it endedLesson for stability
Brasstacks 1986–87Indian exerciseDiplomacy, troop pullbackOpaque nuclear signalling
Kashmir 1990Insurgency, troop movesUS (Gates mission)US as crisis manager
Kargil 1999Pakistani intrusion across LoCClinton–Sharif meeting; withdrawalLimited war under nuclear shadow
Twin Peaks 2001–02Parliament attackUS/UK pressure; Musharraf’s pledgeSlow mobilisation gave space; led to Cold Start
Mumbai 2008LeT attackNo military responseRestraint under nuclear shadow
Uri 2016Attack on army campPakistan denied strikesPublic cross-LoC raids
Pulwama–Balakot 2019JeM suicide bombingPilot returned; both claimed victoryAir strikes on Pakistani territory
Pahalgam–Sindoor 2025Terror attack on touristsDGMO understanding, 10 MayMissile–drone war; faster escalation

Patterns across crises

  1. Trigger: nearly every post-1998 crisis began with a terrorist attack linked by India to Pakistan-based groups.
  2. Rising level of Indian response: restraint (2001–02, 2008) → cross-LoC raids (2016) → air strike in Pakistan (2019) → missile and drone strikes across Pakistan (2025). Each crisis went higher on the escalation ladder than the last.
  3. Short duration: recent crises have been compressed into days, not months.
  4. Third-party role: the US and others have played a role in most crises, though India rejects mediation.
  5. Face-saving exits: both sides usually find a way to claim victory, which helps end the crisis.
  6. No nuclear use: every crisis has stayed below the nuclear threshold so far.

Third Parties and Crisis Management

A special feature of South Asian crises is the role of outside powers, especially the United States. Scholars such as Moeed Yusuf (Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments, 2018) call this “brokered bargaining”: instead of a simple two-player game, South Asian crises are a three-cornered game, in which India and Pakistan each try to influence the third party as well as each other.

Why outside powers get involved

Record of crisis management

CrisisMain third-party role
1990US Gates mission to both capitals
1999 KargilClinton pressed Sharif to withdraw (4 July 1999)
2001–02US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Richard Armitage and UK leaders shuttled between capitals
2008US and UK pressed Pakistan to act against LeT
2019US, Saudi Arabia and UAE reportedly helped to defuse tension and secure the pilot’s release
2025US Vice President and Secretary of State contacted both sides; Gulf states also active

The 2025 controversy over mediation

After Operation Sindoor, the question of third-party involvement became politically sensitive.

This disagreement reflects an old pattern: India prefers bilateralism (based on the Simla Agreement, 1972) and resists outside involvement in Kashmir, while Pakistan seeks internationalisation of the dispute.

Implications for stability

Bilateral mechanisms

Alongside third parties, India and Pakistan have some direct mechanisms:

These mechanisms are useful but limited. There is no regular nuclear dialogue, and political relations have been frozen for long periods. (Arms control and risk reduction are covered in detail in Topic 5.)

The Optimist–Pessimist Debate

The theoretical debate over South Asian nuclear stability is a regional version of a wider debate in international relations about the spread of nuclear weapons.

The general debate: Waltz vs Sagan

The classic statement is Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (1995; later editions A Debate Renewed and An Enduring Debate).

Kenneth Waltz – the proliferation optimist

Scott Sagan – the proliferation pessimist

The South Asian debate: Ganguly vs Kapur

The main regional statement is Šumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (2010).

Šumit Ganguly – the optimist case

S. Paul Kapur – the pessimist case

Other important voices

Comparing the two positions

PointOptimistsPessimists
TheoryStructural realism, rational deterrenceOrganisation theory, psychology
Main claimNuclear weapons prevent major warNuclear weapons encourage risky behaviour and accidents
EvidenceNo full war or nuclear use since 1998Kargil, Twin Peaks, Balakot, Sindoor; militancy
On PakistanRational state that wants survivalRevisionist; military-dominated; uses nuclear shield
On crisesThey end without warThey are increasingly frequent and intense
Policy viewAccept nuclear deterrenceRisk reduction, arms control, resolve disputes

Evaluation

New Sources of Instability

The debate is no longer only about whether nuclear weapons prevent war. Since 2019, and especially since 2025, analysts have focused on new factors that may weaken deterrence stability.

Terrorism as the trigger

Compressed escalation and the “new normal”

Tactical nuclear weapons and early use

Conventional–nuclear entanglement

New technologies

TechnologyPossible effect on stability
MIRVs (Agni-V, Mission Divyastra 2024; Pakistan’s Ababeel)One missile can hit several targets; could encourage first-strike thinking and arms racing
Ballistic missile defence (India’s two-tier BMD)May weaken the other side’s second strike, pushing it to build more missiles
Hypersonic and manoeuvring weaponsVery short warning times; harder to defend against
Sea-based deterrent (Arihant class; Pakistan’s Babur-3)Improves survivability (stabilising) but raises command and control challenges at sea
Drones and loitering munitionsLower the cost of striking; may tempt quick escalation
Cyber and space capabilitiesCould disrupt nuclear command, control and early warning
Artificial intelligenceFaster decisions, but risk of automation bias and errors

Information warfare and misperception

Civil–military relations in Pakistan

The China factor and the strategic chain

Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence in South Asia has passed a basic test: since 1998 there has been no full-scale war and no nuclear use, despite at least six serious crises. This supports the optimists’ claim that nuclear weapons make leaders cautious.

But the region has not achieved robust stability. The stability–instability paradox is visible on both sides: Pakistan’s nuclear shield has coexisted with cross-border militancy, and India has repeatedly sought, and widened, space for conventional punishment below the nuclear threshold. Each crisis has climbed higher on the escalation ladder, and the latest – Operation Sindoor – involved missiles and drones striking deep into both countries in a matter of days.

The main risks today are therefore not a deliberate nuclear first strike, but inadvertent escalation: misreading signals, attacks on dual-use targets, compressed decision time, domestic pressure, information warfare, and the influence of new technologies. Outside powers have helped end past crises, but their role is contested and cannot be relied upon.

For exam answers, a balanced conclusion is that South Asia has a fragile or “ugly” stability: deterrence works at the top of the ladder, but crises below it are frequent and dangerous. Lasting stability requires not just weapons and doctrines, but risk-reduction measures, crisis communication, and political engagement on the underlying disputes, including terrorism and Kashmir.

Quick Revision

ItemKey fact
Stability–instability paradoxGlenn Snyder (1965): nuclear stability at top encourages limited conflict below
Brasstacks crisis1986–87; A. Q. Khan interview; led to nuclear installations agreement (1988)
Gates missionMay 1990 Kashmir crisis
Kargil WarMay–July 1999; Clinton–Sharif meeting 4 July 1999
Twin Peaks / Op ParakramParliament attack 13 Dec 2001; standoff to Oct 2002
Mumbai attacks26–29 Nov 2008; no Indian military response
Surgical strikes29 Sept 2016, after Uri (18 Sept)
BalakotPulwama 14 Feb 2019; air strike 26 Feb; Abhinandan returned 1 Mar
Operation SindoorPahalgam 22 Apr 2025; strikes 7 May; DGMO understanding 10 May
Pakistan’s 2025 responseOperation Bunyan-um-Marsoos
Waltz–SaganThe Spread of Nuclear Weapons (1995): “more may be better” vs “more will be worse”
Ganguly–KapurIndia, Pakistan, and the Bomb (2010)
KapurDangerous Deterrent (2007)
Moeed YusufBrokering Peace in Nuclear Environments (2018): brokered bargaining

One-line memory aids

Exam Practice

Long-answer questions

  1. Explain the concept of deterrence stability. Has nuclear deterrence brought stability to South Asia?
  2. Discuss the stability–instability paradox with reference to India–Pakistan relations.
  3. Critically examine the India–Pakistan crises since 1998. What do they reveal about nuclear deterrence?
  4. Compare the optimist and pessimist views on nuclear stability in South Asia.
  5. What is the role of third parties in managing India–Pakistan crises? Discuss with reference to 2025.
  6. “Operation Sindoor has created a new normal in South Asian deterrence.” Discuss.
  7. Identify the emerging sources of instability in the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan.

Short-answer questions

  1. Crisis stability
  2. Stability–instability paradox
  3. Brasstacks crisis
  4. Kargil War and nuclear deterrence
  5. Operation Parakram
  6. Balakot air strike
  7. Operation Sindoor
  8. Brokered bargaining
  9. Conventional–nuclear entanglement
  10. Waltz–Sagan debate

MCQs (UGC-NET / OPSC style)

  1. The stability–instability paradox was first formulated by:
    • (a) Kenneth Waltz (b) Glenn Snyder (c) Thomas Schelling (d) Bernard Brodie
    • Answer: (b)
  2. Which crisis led India to develop the Cold Start doctrine?
    • (a) Kargil (b) Brasstacks (c) Twin Peaks (2001–02) (d) Balakot
    • Answer: (c)
  3. The author of Dangerous Deterrent (2007) is:
    • (a) Šumit Ganguly (b) S. Paul Kapur (c) Vipin Narang (d) Scott Sagan
    • Answer: (b)
  4. Scott Sagan’s pessimism about proliferation is based mainly on:
    • (a) Structural realism (b) Organisation theory (c) Liberal institutionalism (d) Marxism
    • Answer: (b)
  5. The 1990 crisis between India and Pakistan was defused partly through the mission of:
    • (a) Colin Powell (b) Strobe Talbott (c) Robert Gates (d) Richard Armitage
    • Answer: (c)
  6. India and Pakistan exchange lists of nuclear installations every year on:
    • (a) 1 January (b) 26 January (c) 14 August (d) 1 July
    • Answer: (a)
  7. Match the following:
    • A. Mumbai attacks – 1. 2016
    • B. Uri surgical strikes – 2. 2008
    • C. Balakot air strike – 3. 2025
    • D. Operation Sindoor – 4. 2019
    • Answer: A-2, B-1, C-4, D-3
  8. Assertion (A): Kargil War is cited as an example of the stability–instability paradox. Reason (R): A limited war was fought between two nuclear-armed states without escalating to full-scale war.
    • Answer: Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.
  9. The concept of “brokered bargaining” in South Asian crises is associated with:
    • (a) Moeed Yusuf (b) Michael Krepon (c) Ashley Tellis (d) Feroz Hassan Khan
    • Answer: (a)
  10. The hostilities of May 2025 were halted through an understanding reached between:
    • (a) the two Prime Ministers (b) the two Foreign Ministers (c) the two DGMOs (d) the two NSAs
    • Answer: (c)

Suggested readings

Sources for recent developments

Category: International Relations of South Asia
Tag: Deterrence Stability in South Asia
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